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Abstract 
 This thesis examines the intersection of religious identity, education, partisanship and 
community institutions through a case study of Catholic voting patterns in Detroit from 1960 to 
1972. I build off prior literature investigating the decline in Democratic Party loyalty among 
American Catholics to situate the mobilizing role of Catholic parishes as a missing link between 
demographic and voting trends. By creating a model with fifty-one neighborhoods that combined 
precinct-level presidential election data, demographic data from the census, and the locations of 
Catholic high schools in Detroit, I argue that the presence of Catholic high schools acted as a 
moderating force to stem the tide of suburbanization and diverging Catholic voting patterns. 
With open Catholic high schools as a proxy for parish power and influence, I find strong 
evidence that parishes with Catholic high schools prevented white flight from those 
neighborhoods and inhibited the sharp decline in Democratic voting experienced by Catholics 
nationwide.  
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I. Catholics, Parochial Schools, and the Democratic Party 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Places of worship and schools serve essential functions as pillars of communities, but 
historically Catholic parishes specifically have taken on further importance to their 
neighborhoods. From their inception that followed nativist sentiment and discrimination 
experienced by Catholic immigrants, Catholic parishes were central community anchors that 
informed a century of policy preferences, political ideology, and party identification. This 
relationship between institution and identity for Catholics lasted until the end of the twentieth 
century, when voting patterns that were consistent for a century changed over the course of just a 
few decades.1 During this time, Catholic schools were confronted with financial constraints and 
unsustainable enrollments that led  many to close or relocate to the suburbs.2 This parochial 
                                                 
1 R. Scott Appleby, “Conclusion: The Forgotten American?” in Catholics in the American Century: Recasting 
Narratives of U.S. History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012); Andrew M. Greeley “How Conservative 
Are American Catholics?,” Political Science Quarterly 92, no. 2 (1977): 199-218; Steven K. Green, “Church and 
State in Nineteenth-Century America,” in The Oxford Handbook of Church and State in the United States, vol. 1 
(Oxford University Press, 2010); Scott Greer, “Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party,” The Public Opinion 
Quarterly 25, no. 4 (1961): 611-625; Martin Marger, “Ethnic Succession in Detroit Politics, 1900-1950,” Polity 11, 
no. 3 (1979): 340-361; George J. Marlin, The American Catholic Voter: 200 Years of Political Impact (South Bend, 
Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2004); John T. McGreevy, “Catholics, Democrats, and the GOP in Contemporary 
America,” American Quarterly 59, no. 3 (October 3, 2007): 669-681; John T. McGreevy, Parish Boundaries: The 
Catholic Encounter with Race in the Twentieth-Century Urban North (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago 
Press); William B. Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics: The Passing of the Democratic Monolith, 
xiv, 260 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1999); Nicol C. Rae, “Class and Culture: American 
Political Cleavages in the Twentieth Century,” The Western Political Quarterly, 45, no. 3(1992): 629-650; Roberta 
S. Sigel, “Race and Religion as Factors in the Kennedy Victory in Detroit, 1960,” The Journal of Negro Education 
31, no. 4 (1962): 436-447; Leslie Woodcock Tentler, Seasons of Grace: A History of the Catholic Archdiocese of 
Detroit (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1990). 
2 Jim Carl, “Harold Washington and Chicago’s Schools between Civil Rights and the Decline of the New Deal 
Consensus, 1955-1987,” History of Education Quarterly 41, no. 3 (2001): 311-343; Wilbur J. Cohen, The Financial 
Implications of Changing Patterns on Nonpublic School Operations in Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, and 
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school crisis took on further importance due to the influence of Catholic parishes the in the 
social, political, and spiritual lives of Catholics and the communities in which they are located.3 
General suburbanization, the elevation of social issues, and the improving socioeconomic status 
among Catholics all contribute to this phenomenon.4 However, scholarship on these topics 
contradict and undermine each other, and none of these explanations are specific to Catholics. 
The decline of Catholic schools correlates with these as well, but the centrality of parochial 
schools to Catholic life presents a causal mechanism that can bridge this gap, help explain other 
potentially confounding variables, and relate these circumstances specifically to Catholics. The 
role of parochial schools in the political and social identity of Catholics provides the connection 
between the closing of Catholic schools and shifting Catholic voting patterns. These phenomena 
                                                 
Philadelphia ([S.I.]: Distributed by ERIC Clearinghouse, 1971); Andrew M. Greeley, Catholic Schools in a 
Declining Church (Kansas City, Missouri: Sheed and Ward, 1976): 6; George F. Madaus and Roger Linnan, “The 
Outcome of a Catholic Education?,” The School Review 81, no. 2 (1973): 207-231; Lawrence J. McAndrews, 
“Unanswered Prayers: Church, State and School in the Nixon Era,” U.S. Catholic Historian 13, no. 4 (1995): 81-95; 
Jeffrey Mirel, The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System: Detroit 1907-81 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999); Joseph M. O’Keefe and Aubrey J. Scheopner, “Bridging the Gap: Urban Catholic Schools 
Addressing Educational Achievement and Opportunity Gaps in the United States,” International Studies in Catholic 
Education 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 15-29; Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics, 8, 18.  
3 Margaret F. Brinig, Lost Classroom: Catholic Schools’ Importance in Urban America (Chicago, Illinois: 
University of Chicago Press, 2014); Greeley, Catholic Schools in a Declining Church, 6; Jessica A. Greene and 
Joseph M. O’Keefe, “Enrollment in Catholic Schools in the United States,” in Handbook of Research on Catholic 
Education (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2011); Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor: A Sociological 
Study of Religion’s Impact on Politics, Economics, and Family Life (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961); 
Dale McDonald, “Pluralism and Public Policy: Catholic Schools in the United States,” in Handbook of Research on 
Catholic Education (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2011); McGreevy, Parish Boundaries, 75-78; Eileen 
M. McMahon, What Parish Are You from?: A Chicago Irish Community and Race Relations (Lexington, Kentucky: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 1996); Mirel, The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System, 270, 367; Timothy 
B. Neary, “Black-Belt Catholic Space: African-American Parishes in Interwar Chicago,” U.S. Catholic Historian 18, 
no. 4 (2000): 76-91; Mark Newman, “Desegregation in the Catholic Diocese of Richmond, 1945-1973,” The 
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography; Richmond 117, no. 4 (2009): 357-387; Prendergast, The Catholic 
Voter in American Politics, 8-30; David Riddle, “Race and Reaction in Warren, Michigan, 1971 to 1974: ‘Bradley v. 
Milliken’ and the Cross-District Busing Controversy,” Michigan Historical Review 26, no. 2 (2000): 1-49; Judith 
Stepan-Norris and Caleb Southworth, “Churches as Organizational Resources: A Case study in the Geography of 
Religion and Political Voting in Postwar Detroit,” Social Science History; Durham 31, no.3 (Fall 2007): 343-380. 
Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2014); Tentler, Seasons of Grace, 486-488. 
4 Madaus and Linnan, “The Outcome of a Catholic Education?,” 207-228; McAndrews, “Unanswered Prayers,” 81, 
89-95; Stepan-Norris and Southworth, “Churches as Organizational Resources,” 373, 374. 
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describe national patterns, but the City of Detroit presents a compelling case study to test the 
relationship among these evolutions.  
Through this thesis, I argue that Catholic parishes – using Catholic high schools as a 
proxy for church power and influence – play critical roles in the demographic and political shifts 
among American Catholics in the 1960s and 1970s. By geocoding the locations of open Catholic 
high schools in 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 and comparing precinct-level presidential election 
returns and census tract demographic data, I illustrate these connections. Where Catholic high 
schools closed, the black population share increased amid white flight. Where Catholic high 
schools remained open, Democratic vote share decreased – but to a far lesser extent than among 
Catholics nationwide. These results logically flow from previous research regarding Catholic 
voting and demographic patterns, and position Catholic parishes as central to these trends as 
influential mobilizing institutions.  
The demographic changes Detroit underwent in the twentieth century reflect other major 
cities in the Midwest and Northeast United States, and the city can be seen as a prime example of 
the effects of white flight during the 1960s and 1970s.5 In using Detroit as a case study, the 
results can be compellingly applied to other cities as well. Yet Detroit also stands out; from 1960 
to 1990, the Catholic population in Detroit fell from over 1,000,000 to just 100,00.6  
As changing Catholic voting patterns, the importance of parochial schools, and the role of 
parishes as community institutions intersect with the literal and symbolic significance of a high 
school’s presence, investigating the role of urban high school closings provides an opportunity to 
                                                 
5 Marger, “Ethnic Succession in Detroit Politics,” 345-347; Mirel, The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System, 
270; Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics, 8; Riddle, “Race and Reaction in Warren, Michigan, 
1971-1974,” 32-36; Sigel, “Race and Religion as Factors in the Kennedy Victory in Detroit 1960,” 436-447; Stepan-
Norris and Southworth, “Churches as Organizational Resources,” 373, 374;  Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban 
Crisis, 213; Tentler, Seasons of Grace, 514. 
6 Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics, 8.  
 4 
  
find these answers. The existence of an open Catholic high school can serve as a proxy for parish 
power and influence. When financial crises hit diocese, high schools close first, followed by 
elementary schools, and finally the actual churches. Examining the impact of Detroit Catholic 
high schools closing or moving outside the city grants a specific, detailed study of the political 
and demographic impact of the intersection of the three phenomena that characterize the 
evolution of American Catholic culture after World War II.  
An important caveat is that my thesis only focuses on white ethnic Catholics. White 
ethnic Catholics here are defined as descendants of European immigrants primarily from Eastern 
and Southern Europe and Ireland that are racially classified as “white,” yet ethnically distinct 
from the mainly Anglo-Saxon ancestry of Protestant, white Americans at the time.7 These white 
“ethnics” typically consist of Irish, Italian, Polish, German, and Slavic Catholics, among 
countless others.8 The growth in the Latino population, especially outside the South, is a 
relatively recent phenomenon.9 By 1980 in Detroit, the Latino population had only grown to 
2.6%, and nationwide that number had only reached 10% by 1985.10 Therefore, the growing 
Latino population in the United States today skews the Catholic vote as they lean heavily 
Democratic but were not yet a large enough part of the Detroit population to account for in my 
thesis.  
                                                 
7 Greeley, “How Conservative Are American Catholics?,” 199-218; Marger, “Ethnic Succession in Detroit Politics,” 
347-361; McMahon, What Parish Are You from?, 2; Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis, 19, 22, 106, 239. 
8 Greeley, “How Conservative Are American Catholics?,” 199-218; Marger, “Ethnic Succession in Detroit Politics,” 
347-361; McMahon, What Parish Are You from?, 2; Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis, 19, 22, 106, 239. 
9 Emily M. Eng, “Who Are U.S. Catholics? Numbers Show a Surprising Shift,” National Geographic News, 
September 17, 2015, https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/09/150917-data-points-how-catholic-population-
has-shifted-in-the-united-states/ 
10 Eng, “Who Are U.S. Catholics?;” “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United 
States: 1850-2000,” United States Census.  
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The question of what led Catholics to abandon their Democratic Party loyalty in the 
1960s and 1970s, after maintaining fierce allegiance for over a century remains. This puzzle goes 
beyond simple partisan or ideological politics; the Democratic and Republican Parties evolved 
significantly from the 1850s through the 1950s, even trading positions on many issues.11 Despite 
this, Catholics remained steadfast Democrats until the 1960s and 1970s.12 Learning how and why 
this shift occurred, along with the role of parochial schools and the socializing effects of 
parishes, will allow for a deeper understanding of the intricacies of identity politics. The goal is 
to learn when, how, and why partisan identification and political preferences shift and lose 
significance as central aspects of social identity.  
By compiling precinct-level voting data in Detroit for presidential elections and 
comparing the results in areas surrounding open Catholic high schools, the relationship among 
these historical evolutions can become quantified. A more nuanced understanding of the national 
trends of Catholic political identity can then be extrapolated and applied to other cities that 
experience similar levels of Catholic prominence and subsequent suburbanization, such as 
Boston, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia.13  
The introductory chapter of this thesis continues with a review of the scholarly literature 
regarding the shift in Catholic voting patterns, the importance of parochial schools, and the role 
of parishes as tools of political mobilization. The theoretical argument defending my hypotheses, 
and my methodology come after the literature review to finish the introduction. I will then 
                                                 
11 McAndrews, “Unanswered Prayers,” 81, 89-95; 1; James M. Penning, “Changing Partisanship and Issue Stands 
among American Catholics,” Sociological Analysis 47, no. 1 (1986): 29-49; Rae, “Class and Culture,” 629, 630. 
12 Greeley, “How Conservative Are American Catholics?,” 212-218; Greer, “Catholic Voters and the Democratic 
Party,” 611-625; McGreevy, “Catholics, Democrats, and the GOP in Contemporary America,” 669-681; Penning, 
“Changing Partisanship and Issue Stands among American Catholics, 29-49; Rae, “Class and Culture,” 629-650. 
13 Appleby, “The Forgotten American?,” 160; Marger, “Ethnic Succession in Detroit Politics,” 340-361; Marlin, The 
American Catholic Voter, 214, 242, 259, 271; McGreevy, Parish Boundaries, 209-216; Prendergast, The Catholic 
Voter in American Politics, 8-30; Rae, “Class and Culture,” 637; Tentler, Seasons of Grace, 486-488. 
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examine the results of my data in the subsequent four chapters, covering the 1960, 1964, 1968, 
and 1972 presidential elections, respectively. Finally, I conclude with a chapter summarizing the 
aggregate results, contextualizing the implications, and suggesting prospects for future research. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Catholic Voting Patterns 
 
Detroit offers a compelling case study for the relationship between parishes, parochial 
school, and Catholic voting patterns due to its prominence in prior research, historically powerful 
Catholic population, and continued Democratic party loyalty. To set the stage for the case study, 
evidence must be presented for three developments that led to the circumstances that defined 
Detroit and other major American cities in the 1960s and 1970s. The historical dominance of 
Catholics by the Democratic Party until the 1970s, the centrality of parochial schools to the 
social, political, and spiritual life of Catholics, and the role of Catholic parishes as tools of 
political mobilization all contribute to portray Detroit as a persuasive case study that can 
accurately represent the relationships among these phenomena. 
While Catholics ceased voting in such strong Democratic numbers by the 1980s, the 
exact timing of the shift in voting patterns has been debated. Greer investigates whether the 
upward social mobility experienced by ethnic Catholics since the New Deal and the subsequent 
suburbanization of Catholic communities has led to a breakdown in the New Deal coalition.14 
                                                 
14 Greer, “Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party,” 611-625. 
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Using a case study in metropolitan St. Louis, Missouri, Greer finds that party preference among 
Catholics in the central city and suburbs remains strongly Democratic, but suburban Catholics do 
show some signs of weaker party loyalty and different policy preferences than urban Catholics.15 
Greer attributes these differences to a mix of country of origin, generations since migration, and 
education, but acknowledges that the trends experienced by suburban Catholics were also 
reflected in non-Catholics as well.16 Therefore, this shift among suburban Catholics might simply 
be a reflection of a nation-wide trend regardless of religious affiliation.  
Greeley counters the conception that ethnic Catholic voters began to drift away from the 
Democratic Party, epitomized by the defection from McGovern during the 1972 presidential 
election.17 Greeley summarizes a variety of studies, surveys, and presidential voting data to 
conclude that the evidence runs contrary to this myth.18 The primary puzzle Greeley seeks to 
solve is the popular myth of the conservatism of blue-collar Catholic ethnics who have elevated 
social classes, moved to the suburbs, and consequently based their vote on social issues owned 
by the Republican Party.19 The data, however, highlights that even in 1972, Irish, German, 
Italian, and Polish Catholic were still more likely to support McGovern and other Democrats 
than the average American.20 Further data regarding Catholic policy positions on the Vietnam 
War, racial integration, support for unions, and an extensive welfare state corroborate the voting 
data.21  
                                                 
15 Greer, “Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party,” 623-625. 
16 Greer, “Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party,” 623-625. 
17 Greeley, “How Conservative Are American Catholics?,” 199-218. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Greeley, “How Conservative Are American Catholics?,” 212-218. 
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Penning also investigates the conventional wisdom surrounding the supposed 
conservative shift among American Catholics from 1972 through 1983, finding that ideological 
positions had only changed slightly while party identification has shifted more significantly 
among American Catholics.22 While acknowledging Democratic loyalty as a tradition among 
Catholics, Penning argues that ideological homogeneity has never been an aspect of Catholic 
allegiance to the Democratic Party.23 Using national survey data related to party identification, 
policy positions, and political ideology, Penning shows that ethnic white Catholics were still 
more liberal than the average American despite slightly more conservative and politically 
independent behavior throughout the 1970s.24 
Rae provides a history of cultural cleavages that shaped the American political arena 
throughout the twentieth century.25 The end of the New Deal era with Nixon’s victory in 1968 
signaled a shift in the voting patterns of the traditional foundations of the New Deal coalition – 
especially ethnic Catholics.26 Through the initial embrace of Catholic immigrants, the power 
wielded by the city bosses of political machines, and the broad support for organized labor and 
government action through the New Deal, the Democratic Party managed to maintain strong 
loyalty of white ethnic Catholics until signs of dissent first appeared in 1952.27 Rae asserts that 
civil rights, abortion, and church-state issues came to the political forefront because of the stage 
set by the 1952 presidential election.28 As Republicans exploited these social issues for their 
benefit, Democrats lost their grip on the vote of white Catholics.29 Rae concludes by 
                                                 
22 Penning, “Changing Partisanship and Issue Stands among American Catholics, 29-49. 
23 Penning, “Changing Partisanship and Issue Stands among American Catholics, 31. 
24 Ibid, 29-49. 
25 Rae, “Class and Culture,” 629-650. 
26 Ibid, 629, 630. 
27 Ibid, 637. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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acknowledging that remnants of the New Deal coalition remain but emphasizing that the cultural 
issues that tore it apart in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s will continue to shape party allegiances, 
just as the 1920s did for the New Deal coalition.30 
Similarly, McGreevy investigates the historical origins of the contemporary partisan split 
among Catholics from the initial Catholic affiliation with the Democratic Party, through the fight 
over birth control access, and finally to modern Catholic suspicion of liberalism.31 Attributing 
this shift to birth control, McGreevy asserts that the seeds of division began to sprout as early as 
the 1940s – significantly earlier than much of the literature on Catholic voting patterns.32 State 
laws and court cases throughout the middle of the twentieth century provide the evidence for his 
hypothesis.33 Most striking, however, is McGreevy’s claim that the Democratic Party itself 
shifted far to the left on abortion and birth control.34 This suggests that it was not simply the 
elevation of social issues to the political forefront, but particular policy positions chosen by the 
Democratic Party that helped encourage Catholic Democratic rejection, although much of the 
other scholarly work directly contradicts this theory.  
In providing a revisionist Catholic history in the United States, Appleby instead 
emphasizes the shift in Catholic worldview that coincided with changing voting patterns and 
ideological preferences.35 Catholic institutions, lay people, and clergy – including bishops in 
some cases – were all but formal extensions of the Democratic Party from the middle of the 
nineteenth century through the 1960s.36 As their historical struggles and discrimination faded 
                                                 
30 Rae, “Class and Culture,” 637-644. 
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further into the past while incomes, social status, and acceptance as fully white and American 
grew, Catholics refashioned themselves with a white-collar perception and reputation.37  
Marger traces the role that ethnicity and political identification played in this social 
elevation through the evolution of Detroit political power from 1900-1950.38 The results suggest 
a heavy ethno-religious political split; white Protestants and Catholics were predominantly 
Republicans and Democrats, respectively, while black Detroiters voted overwhelmingly 
Democratic since the New Deal.39 The Irish and Polish Catholics dominated Detroit politics 
through variations of union and machine politics, which casts Detroit in a similar light as other 
major cities throughout the Midwest and Northeast United States.40 
Sigel scrutinizes these roles of race and religion in President Kennedy’s 1960 election in 
Detroit.41 As the first Catholic president, Kennedy’s election can be seen as the zenith of 
Catholic political power and influence – the culmination of over a century of struggle into the 
American cultural and political mainstream. As the New Deal coalition fought to maintain itself 
after consecutive defeats to Eisenhower, Detroit’s voting bloc for Kennedy represented a 
possible renewal of the New Deal coalition.42 Detroit, like other large cities, voted heavily 
Democratic due to large Catholic and black populations.43 Kennedy’s strong victory in Detroit 
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38 Marger, “Ethnic Succession in Detroit Politics,” 340-361. 
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allowed him to barely carry the state, and he owed that victory to overwhelming Catholic and 
black support.44 
An important note is that even in the Eisenhower elections, Detroit Catholics remained 
far more Democratic than other white Christians.45 In Lenski’s case study of religiosity in 
Detroit, 57% of Catholics identified as Democrats compared to only 19% as Republicans in his 
study, which included both the city and its suburbs.46 The coalition responsible was reflected in 
large cities across the United States, especially the Midwest and Northeast.47 In Detroit, this New 
Deal coalition, comprised of primarily of African Americans, Jewish people, and Catholics along 
with labor power, ascended with Frank Murphy’s mayoral race in 1930 and the solidification of 
these voting blocs following his victory.48  
Again, scholars differ on the timing and causes of eventual diverging Catholic voting 
patterns. Brewer, Marlin, and Prendergast chronicle the history of American Catholic voting 
patterns and their political impact.49 Democratic Party identification among Catholics from 1952 
to 1978 barely changed, declining from 68% to 65%.50 Brewer reaffirms this consistency in party 
identification, also noting that House of Representatives voting remained more heavily 
Democratic than presidential voting among Catholics.51 These contradictions and wide-ranging 
explanations suggests that suburbanization and social issues may not have affected party loyalty 
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or political ideology to such a drastic extent. In the City of Detroit, however, demographic 
change had a substantial impact as suburbanization eventually led almost all white Catholics out 
of the city, though not by 1972.52  
The prior literature regarding Catholic voting patterns in the United States from the 
middle to the end of the twentieth century presents a clear pattern. Importantly, this trend holds 
up when narrowed to the City of Detroit during the same period, supporting the use of Detroit as 
a case study. By the 1980s, Democratic loyalty was no longer a guarantee among America 
Catholics. Changing demographics and the elevation of social issues surely accelerated this 
process, but a decline in the amount of parochial schools accompanied these changes and is vital 
to a more complete understanding. 
 
Parochial Schools 
 
Green details the relationship between church and state throughout the 1800s, 
highlighting the introduction of parochial schools as one of the defining issues.53 By providing a 
historical basis of Catholic dedication to their parochial education system, Green advances the 
theory of schools as central anchors in Catholics communities.54 The anti-Catholic sentiment that 
influenced laws and social norms to exclude Catholics from the public school system and intense 
legal battles surrounding parochial schools drove Catholics to relish their schools as safeguards 
against further marginalization.55 
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 McAndrews chronicles the wave of support and later defeat of public funding of 
parochial and nonpublic schools throughout the country in the twentieth century.56 By studying 
the principles and politics that led to the issue’s prominence and subsequent abandonment, 
McAndrews highlights the widening split among American Catholics in the 1960s and 1970s.57 
Frequently citing a 1971 poll showing parochial school aid as the most important issue to 
Catholics, McAndrews presents the Nixon and Republican courting of Catholic votes by 
championing this issue as the main cause of political turmoil among Catholics.58 The necessity of 
public funding of parochial schools stemmed from the unsustainable increase in Catholic school 
enrollment from the 1940s until the 1960s then the rapid closing of over 1000 Catholic schools 
from 1963 through 1969 as enrollment plummeted.59 Catholics were naturally impassioned about 
saving their school system from collapse, but the fiscal advantages of Catholic schools garnered 
significant support from political conservatives as well.60 McAndrews emphasizes that this and 
other social issues increased the fractioning of the New Deal coalition, with liberal and 
conservative Catholics conflicted about the causes and solutions to the crisis of the Catholic 
school system.61 This struggle combined lingering Democratic loyalty and a lack of consensus 
among Catholic leaders in Congress, preventing federal action that resulted in over 100 bills 
failing to pass through the legislature.62  
Madaus and Linnan consolidate prior research on the outcomes of Catholic schools to 
illustrate the crossroads at which Catholic schools were stuck in the early 1970s.63 The financial 
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hardships, demographic changes, and shifting worldviews away from their historical base all 
contributed to this crisis.64 Madaus and Linnan review studies that claim Catholic schools are 
desirable due to higher educational outcomes than their public school counterparts, thoroughly 
covering the shortcomings of these studies which fail to prove definitively that Catholic schools 
directly cause those results.65 The popular conception of divisiveness regarding Catholic schools 
in public opinion – even among Catholics themselves – is also highlighted, with Madaus and 
Linnan conflicting the later assertions of McAndrews, citing the lack of extensive research on the 
topic.66 Madaus and Linnan do not resolve these crossroads for Catholic schools, but, 
importantly, they point out two vital changes in parochial schools: the spread out from urban 
centers and the shared goal to qualify for federal support.67 Although some parts of the study 
conflict with Greeley, McAndrews, and other scholars, they critically acknowledge that 
demographic and geographic shifts of the Catholic population and schools are essential to the 
concurrent shifts in Catholic voting patterns.68 
O’Keefe and Scheopner take this issue to a modern case study on the educational 
achievement gap between parochial and public schools.69 As parochial schools close due to 
financial struggles, the results for the communities they serve harken back to the financial crises 
of Catholic parishes in the 1970s. The increased student achievement among minority students 
mostly served by these Catholic schools disappears when the resources of the schools vanish as 
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their doors close.70 Greeley also discusses the roles of parochial schools as the influence and 
financial strength of parishes declined over the 1960s and 1970s.71 Despite declining Catholic 
enrollment in parochial schools, political, economic, and emotional support for the Catholic 
school system remained strong among American Catholics.72  
Tentler highlights the impact of parochial aid in Catholic voting patterns.73 Parochial aid 
was an issue mainly important to Catholics, so the Catholic split over the issue essentially 
reflected a fight over Catholic exceptionalism or continued assimilation.74 Mirel corroborates this 
idea in his study of Detroit schools from 1907 to 1971.75 Schools and taxes were important issues 
that split the New Deal coalition for Democrats, and the financial crises of Catholic parishes had 
taken its toll on the Archdiocese of Detroit by the mid-1970s.76 By 1973, 137 of 360 Catholic 
schools shut their doors for good.77 Cohen investigates the financial implications of the crises in 
Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia.78 If all Catholic schools in Detroit closed in the 
early 1970s, Detroit Public Schools would have needed at least $108,500,000 to cover the costs 
to integrate those students into the public school system.79  
This literature advances the idea that American Catholic schools have been essential 
components of American Catholic social identity and community relationships. As parochial 
schools faced crises in the 1960s and 1970s, the divergent ideas for solutions exacerbated 
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political differences that began to spring out of changing demographics and suburbanization 
among white Catholics. And similar to voting patterns, Detroit’s history with parochial schools 
reflects the national trend and further sets itself up as a compelling case study. The correlation 
exists, and following logically therefore suggests that Catholic schools – physically and 
spiritually – were of utmost importance to urban Catholic communities, and in-turn their political 
preferences. 
Parish Institutions 
 
Religious institutions as tools of political mobilization and community engagement have 
been well-documented, with case studies on major cities consistently showing these effects. 
Specifically, Catholic parishes constituted the physical anchors of neighborhoods and the centers 
of both spiritual and social life for Catholics and the surrounding communities. In her analysis of 
Irish racial relations in Chicago, McMahon asserts that Catholic churches offered more than 
religious services.80 Catholic churches were the heart and souls of neighborhoods, “vital to 
Catholic subculture.”81 In his Detroit case study, Lenski claims that Catholic schools increase 
ties to this Catholic subculture.82 In her book on urban Catholic schools, Brinig speaks of 
Catholic schools as community institutions that “bolster neighborhood social cohesion.”83  The 
losses of these schools, consequently, hurt the typically poor, under-served neighborhoods in 
which they were located.84 In his Youngstown, Ohio examination of Catholic grade schools, 
Welsh goes even further, declaring the urban parochial school as possibly the most important 
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community institution.85 These Catholic communities were ethnically diverse, but were all built 
in “broader ‘Catholic’ culture,” which began to wilt in the 1960s as a result of school closings.86 
In their report on politics and religion in postwar Detroit, Stepan-Norris and Southworth 
suggest Catholic parishes’ roles in integration and neighborhood stabilization as community 
anchors contributed to their Democratic loyalty. In using Detroit in the 1950s as a case study, 
separating religious denominations, and studying electoral outcomes, Stepan-Norris and 
Southworth find that religious denomination is influential among their constituencies, with the 
socioeconomic statuses of their geographic location causing some variation in the impact.87 
Democratic loyalty among Catholics developed initially as a means to provide social and 
financial support in a society traditionally antagonistic toward Catholicism, which led to 
skepticism regarding the impact of Catholicism on political influence.88 Stepan-Norris and 
Southworth find, however, that Catholic churches increased political activity among members 
and positively contributed to Democratic vote share in their neighborhoods.89 Thus, Catholic 
churches are vital resources for political organization and mobilization.90 
The role of Catholic schools in the desegregation of urban communities throughout the 
United States created deeper ties to parishes’ surrounding communities. As financial crises hit 
diocese throughout the country and parochial school enrollment dropped, Catholic schools began 
to serve the non-Catholic and minority communities of their neighborhoods. Greene and 
O’Keefe study Catholic school enrollment patterns and find that school closings from the latter 
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half of the twentieth century onward primarily affected minority students91. Already by 1983, 
58% of students in parochial schools were minorities.92 These communities were becoming 
increasingly diverse, and despite the wishes of some Catholic homeowners, the clergy and 
Catholic hierarchy largely encouraged inclusion and integration.93 
In a study of the decline of the New Deal coalition in Chicago, Carl emphasizes the role 
of Catholic schools as community institutions that provided a ladder to elevate black leaders in 
the city.94 Community leaders that came from Catholic schools – whether black Protestants or 
white ethnic Catholics – opposed the closing of parochial schools when funding required 
cutbacks in education.95 Newman describes a similar situation in the Catholic Diocese of 
Richmond.96 Although Virginia may not spring to mind as a center of American Catholic culture, 
Newman’s case study bolsters the argument of Catholic importance in the process of 
desegregation.97 Catholic clergy became vocal supporters of integration in Richmond, which led 
to action in parochial schools when public schools lagged behind with continued dedication to 
segregation.98 McDonald’s study of the impact of urban Catholic schools arrives at similar 
conclusions as Carl, Newman, and Stepan-Norris and Southworth.99 Operating as essentially 
public institutions that serve the common good, parochial schools have provided support and 
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services to minority communities.100 From their historical role in desegregation to modern urban 
Catholic parishes that now serve predominantly Latino or non-Catholic populations, Catholic 
churches and schools have simply evolved in their roles as urban community anchors.  
Riddle, Tentler, Mirel, Lenski, McGreevy, and Sugrue follow Stepan-Norris and 
Southworth and put this evidence further to the test by investigating Catholics in Detroit.101 
Riddle examines the reactions before and after the Bradley v. Milliken Supreme Court decision 
that ended cross-district busing solutions for racial integration.102 Detroit Archbishop John 
Dearden led Catholic hierarchy in vocally supporting racial integration – and busing as one 
potential solution – and went so far as to prevent Catholic schools from capitalizing on the 
situation and becoming a refuge for opponents of integration.103 Riddle highlights how 
Dearden’s commitment to integration coincided with the closing of four Catholic schools in 
suburban Macomb County in order to maintain three schools in the City of Detroit that served 
increasingly non-Catholic and mostly black communities.104 This vital role in desegregation 
spearheaded by Catholic hierarchy and organizations is further supported by the findings of 
Greeley that parochial school graduates are less racist and less anti-Semitic than the public and 
other Catholics as a whole.105 It logically follows that the clear support among Catholic leaders 
for integration permeated schools and influenced Catholic opinion.  
In Tentler’s history of the Archdiocese of Detroit, she highlights the changing role of 
Catholic parishes as the demographic makeup of the city evolved.106 As the black population in 
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the city increased, so did positive opinions of Catholics among African Americans.107 This 
coincided with Archbishop Dearden’s shift to focus on War on Poverty programs and increased 
support for integration and inner-city social services.108 Mirel follows this, discussing the role of 
parochial schools in the evolution of Detroit Public Schools as some middle-class African 
Americans abandoned public schools in favor of parochial schools still open.109 The logic behind 
this improved perception is supported by Lenski, who asserts that black Protestants’ favorable 
views of Catholics are due to Catholic hierarchy’s vocal stance in favor of integration.110 By the 
mid-1980s, the Catholic heyday was over, and schools and services both served predominantly 
non-Catholic communities.111  
McGreevy scrutinizes the understandings of urban Catholic community and racial 
relations.112 In both a literal and figurative sense, Catholic neighborhoods centered around a 
church, with a school and recreational facilities often attached.113 This allowed parishes to cast a 
broad range of influence over those living in surrounding neighborhoods, which in turn 
facilitated Catholic leadership and participation in community organizations.114 Catholic leaders 
– clergy and lay – such as Fr. John Coogan of the University of Detroit, Hope Brophy, who led 
the Archbishop’s Commission on Human Rights, and Archbishop John Dearden encouraged 
parishes to welcome black community members, promoted student support for the freedom 
riders, and took an active role in the administering programs for the War on Poverty.115 
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In his seminal work on the racial relations, inequality, and urban decline of postwar 
Detroit, Sugrue continues the work of McGreevy and underscores the importance of physical and 
spiritual community for Catholics that were tied together in neighborhoods with a parish and 
parochial school at the center.116 Yet he focuses on the tension brought about by these intense 
communal bonds.117 This had the juxtaposed effect of Catholic leaders and organizations 
encouraging and supporting racial integration while many Catholic lay people fiercely opposed 
integration into their sacred neighborhoods, leading to conflict and racial resentment.118 The 
Catholic desire for the mainstream emphasized by Appleby took physical shape in these 
neighborhoods.119 Catholic neighborhoods on the surface were not unlike the rest of the city; 
communal neighborhoods were the norm.120 But in Wayne County, which was 65% Catholic by 
the 1950s, Catholic neighborhoods took on out-sized importance culturally and physically.121 
“Family, parish, and neighborhood” were the three spheres of Catholicism, from which spiritual 
and social life flowed as a reflection of pride in their Catholic identity.122 These deep roots in 
physical locations prevented Catholics from simply leaving to avoid integration, as was possible 
for Jewish people and white Protestants.123 Though this led to inevitable and constant conflict, it 
also facilitated positive Catholic action in support of integration through the Catholic Interracial 
Council and the leadership of Archbishop Dearden, among others.124 
Parishes were therefore true community anchors in every sense of the word. Their effects 
on Catholic political mobilization, relationships with the parochial schools they operated, and 
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interactions with the rapidly-changing surrounding neighborhoods illustrate their massive 
influence. In Detroit as in cities across the country, the power of Catholic parishes to impose 
change and give direction to their communities – for good and bad – can hardly be disputed. 
The shift was gradual, imperfect, and far from a complete Democratic abandonment, but 
from the 1960s through the 1980s, white Catholics became more ideologically moderate and less 
partisan – reflecting political preferences typical of a generic white American rather than their 
historically liberal views and Democratic loyalty. Social wedge issues, suburbanization, and 
improved socioeconomic status among Catholics all contributed to this trend in some form.  
Still, the decline of parochial schools reflects this same pattern of the Catholic 
Democratic vote share. Whether they exacerbated an initial division or were more instrumental 
in the political shift, parochial schools were vital to their communities. As financial crises 
gripped diocese, enrollment in parochial schools plummeted, and neighborhood makeups 
drastically shifted, Catholics never forgot the historical importance of the parochial school 
system. However, the divergent opinions on possible solutions proved too divisive, and the once-
unifying issue morphed into a battle for the political soul of Catholics.  
Nevertheless, these physical structures – parochial schools and their churches – anchored 
neighborhoods, connected parishes to traditionally marginalized communities, and consequently 
facilitated Catholic political activity and Democratic Party loyalty. Catholics saw their schools 
close and parishes shrink but social standing increase as they moved out to the suburbs. In turn, 
they lost the ability and desire to mobilize in favor of integration, government services, and other 
social justice issues intimately related to hardships confronting cities that historically connected 
them to the Democratic Party. 
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The Argument for Catholic Parishes as the Missing Link 
 
Social issues, white flight, and evolving demographics have all been suggested by prior 
literature as components of changing Catholic voting patterns, but their contradictions and broad 
explanations lack the causality to fully encompass why Catholics specifically departed from their 
historical Democratic loyalty. As the correlation exists, it’s possible – even likely – that the 
closing or suburban relocation of urban Catholic schools directly contributed to shifting voting 
patterns among white Catholics. The causal mechanism facilitating this effect is the centrality of 
Catholic schools in relation to Catholic identity, their surrounding neighborhoods, and shaping 
Catholic political preferences. The premises that provide the basis for causality are the historical 
Democratic loyalty among Catholics, the consistent importance of the parochial school system to 
Catholics, and the socializing effects and broad influence of Catholic parishes in their 
surrounding neighborhoods. These factors existed nationwide as in Detroit, making the city a 
compelling case study. The role of parishes in political and social organizing as the central 
connection for evolving Catholic voting patterns and the importance of Catholic schools 
persuasively suggests that declining parish power and influence caused these phenomena. 
Schools closing and the subsequent drop in parish influence accelerated white flight and 
permitted the divergence of Catholic voting patterns. 
This shift in Catholic voting patterns is been well-documented above, with changing 
Democratic Party platforms, evolving social issues, and growing social status and 
suburbanization all hypothesized as affecting Catholic voting patterns in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Scholars have found some slight consensus that social issues and suburbanization have played a 
role, though magnitude remains uncertain. The logic behind the timeline, however, simply does 
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not hold. Catholics were overwhelmingly Democratic since mass immigration into northern 
metropolises in the middle of the nineteenth century, and this pattern sustained through vast, 
dramatic political party changes.125 Of course, pure ideological homogeneity was not quite a 
staple of political parties yet, as shown through the Democratic Solid South that fiercely opposed 
the growing influence of African Americans in the Democratic Party after the New Deal.126 
Nevertheless, Catholics remained loyal Democrats until the latter half of the twentieth century.  
The specific issues that caused the splitting Catholic vote are still debated as well. As 
divisive social issues such as abortion, and later gay marriage, came to prominence in American 
politics, Catholic voting patterns began to diverge.127 This correlation does not imply causality. 
The elevation of social issues’ prominence did not alter Catholic social teaching on the topic, or 
the historical Catholic focus on social justice issues and the allocation of social services that 
traditionally aligned them with the Democratic Party.128 Further, the effect of these social issues 
on actually changing the voting patterns of Catholics has been disputed by scholars.129 Finally, 
lending the utmost importance to social issues while discounting other correlating and potentially 
more compelling variables, such as elevated social status in the American mainstream, creates a 
logical gap. Again, parties change and evolve throughout history, issues come and go in 
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importance, and yet to assume these specific issues trump historical patterns seems to be a 
fallacious argument.  
The most plausible of the traditional explanations is the elevated social status of 
American Catholics by the end of the twentieth century. With their leadership in political 
machines, from Tammany Hall in New York to Chicago and Detroit, Catholics had been 
climbing the ladder and slowly assimilating into the American mainstream to lose their status as 
“other” – essentially becoming fully white and therefore American.130 Appleby, Riddle, Sugrue, 
and Tentler also suggest that as their initial struggles and discrimination faded further into 
history, Catholic worldview and self-images shifted as well.131 The focus on social justice issues 
that characterize life in working class urban neighborhoods were no longer prioritized by many 
Catholics.132 Suburbanization, therefore, is the manifestation of this phenomenon. Catholics 
literally leaving their former working-class homes as the black population in cities increased 
with a corresponding increase in Republican voting among Catholics presents a potentially 
persuasive case for this theory. But because only the richest Catholics showed strong signs of a 
shift toward true Republican Party loyalty over the 1960s and 1970s, this is far from 
representative of overall Catholic political behavior.133 
Furthermore, this claim coincides with the closing of Catholic schools, the ensuing loss 
of “otherness” as Catholics, and the unique communal bonds that kept Catholic communities 
together throughout much of American Catholic history. The causality of white flight and 
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suburbanization presents another issue with this theory. Brinig, Greeley, McMahon, Mirel, 
McGreevy, Neary, Prendergast, Stepan-Norris and Southworth, Sugrue, and Welsh all discuss 
the importance of the physical location of parishes and their influence on surrounding 
neighborhoods.134 Because of this, Catholics could not simply pack their bags and move away. A 
more logical sequence, then, is that strong Catholic parishes were buttresses against white flight 
and for continued Democratic support among Catholics. When parochial schools closed and 
parishes became weaker and less influential is when the effects of white flight likely began to 
take hold. 
Catholics were still far more Democratic than other white Christians even during this 
period of suburbanization and diverging Catholic voting.135 If social issues, elevated social 
standing, and suburbanization were truly responsible, then contemporary Catholic voting patterns 
directly contradict these arguments. Even when adjusting for only non-Hispanic white Catholics, 
they are still more likely to vote Democratic than other white Protestants.136 This further limits 
possible explanations, but far from rules out the argument that if a parochial high school 
remained open and the parish was therefore able to exert out-sized influence in the surrounding 
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community, Catholics would have continued to vote more Democratic than otherwise and 
suburbanization among Catholics would have been mitigated.  
Catholic education was traditionally a central component to Catholic identity because of 
their historical exclusion from public education and the emphasis on social justice issues present 
in urban parochial schools, not because of any educational advantages.137 Catholic schools arose 
to protect from discrimination in public schools and to provide a sense of community in the face 
of political abandonment.138 For most of their history, Catholic schools were a democratizing 
force in education, stabilizing communities by educating marginalized, impoverished, and 
minority communities otherwise neglected.139 
Even as Catholic enrollment in parochial schools fell and urban parishes began to serve 
predominantly minority and non-Catholic communities, the issue of parochial aid and the 
importance of the Catholic school system never fell as a priority for Catholics. Parochial aid was 
not an issue for non-Catholics, but it managed to divide the Catholic community, proving to be a 
wedge issue similar to abortion and other social issues that gained prominence during this 
time.140 
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Yet even in the 1962, near the height of the power and scope of the parochial school 
system, only 52% of Catholics were enrolled in parochial schools.141 This suggests that Catholics 
had already been contemplating the future of the parochial school system, and that Catholic 
schools had long been serving the needs of non-Catholics. Both are key points in understanding a 
more symbolic – yet important – role of parochial schools in the minds of Catholics. First, the 
closing of parochial schools in 1962 would have affected roughly half of Catholics – a number 
that would decrease each subsequent year. So for many Catholics, the importance of parochial 
aid represented a symbolic institution of their own, which they did not wish to see weakened or 
failing. Second, the connection to other historically marginalized communities – especially 
African Americans – forced Catholics and their institutions into a more progressive, social 
justice-oriented worldview.142 Although racism was often prominent and conflict consistently 
arose between the two communities throughout the country, including Detroit, both Catholics 
and African Americans were part of the same voting coalition since the New Deal and had 
several overarching aligning priorities.143 
This leads to the critical causal mechanism connecting the emblematic importance of 
parochial schools to shifting voting patterns: the role of parishes as community institutions. 
Fundamental to Catholic identity, parishes and parochial schools have served as sources of 
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stability in the face of anti-Catholic sentiment, institutions promoting social mobility and 
integration of marginalized communities abandoned by public schools, and as resources of 
political organization.144 Schools represent more than places of education. They are symbols of 
parish influence and strength, further solidifying them as pillars of the community. The strongest 
parishes have the largest number of parishioners and therefore the funding for high schools in 
addition to elementary schools. This ties back to the causality question with suburbanization. 
Funding for schools, social services, and other community programs fall if Catholics leave the 
neighborhood. But Catholics leave neighborhoods with weaker parishes that do not operate 
parochial schools, especially in dense urban neighborhoods where parishes wield the most 
influence. A vicious cycle results, leaving financially-strapped parishes serving increasingly 
minority communities without the requisite resources, therefore adversely affecting those 
communities even further. 
The history of Catholic political power and the case studies of their roles in political 
machines, the labor movement, and integration efforts illustrate the mobilizing capabilities of 
parishes. In detailing political histories of American Catholics, Appleby, Greeley, Marger, 
Marlin, Prendergast, and Tentler discuss the rise of Catholics in organized, machine politics 
made capable due to the mobilizing power of parishes.145 In case studies of Chicago, Richmond, 
and Youngstown, Carl and McMahon, Newman, and Welsh highlight the key roles played by 
groups and leaders that grew out of parishes through their central location and importance in 
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working-class Catholic and increasingly black neighborhoods.146 And most importantly for this 
Detroit case study, Stepan-Norris and Southworth, Sugrue, McGreevy, Sigel, Marger, Lenski, 
and Tentler emphasize the political power of Catholic institutions in Detroit.147 Catholic 
community leaders, such as Cardinal Edward Mooney, Archbishop Dearden, Bishop Thomas 
Gumbleton, Fr. John Coogan, and Hope Brophy set examples for lay people to follow. And 
through Catholic participation in and with organizations such as the Catholic Interracial Council, 
the Archbishop’s Council on Human Rights, the United Auto Workers, National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, the Mayor’s Interracial Committee, the Michigan Council 
of Churches, and the Northwest Community Organization, Catholic social involvement grew 
from their spiritual and physical centers in their parishes.148 
These examples of political mobilization in pursuit of social justice would logically lead 
to the Democratic voting patterns that Catholics nationwide and in Detroit exhibited. As prior 
research has pointed out, Detroit Catholics were both more politically active and far more 
Democratic than other white Christians, even as some landslide swing elections caused 
fluctuations in overall Catholic voting patterns.149  
Thus informs the two central premises of this thesis. Catholic parishes were so significant 
in the lives of Catholics, that their decline likely facilitated and exacerbated the suburbanization 
and white flight among Catholics in the 1960s and 1970s. And as these parishes declined and 
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Catholics moved, their connection to their own political history, the social justice issues that 
inspired that it, and the proximity to other marginalized communities with common political 
goals all faded from memory and relevance. These dual suppositions through parish influence 
present the case for causality between the importance of parochial schools and changing Catholic 
voting patterns. By studying Detroit as a model and using the presence of Catholic high schools 
as a proxy for parish power and influence, the interactions between these phenomena can be 
quantitatively examined. 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
H1: In neighborhoods where Catholic high schools closed, the black population share among the 
population increased. 
H2: In neighborhoods where Catholic high schools remained open, the Democratic vote share 
among the population decreased. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 To test these two hypotheses with Detroit as my case city, I compared election patterns of 
neighborhoods containing Catholic high schools in the 1960s and early 1970s. I focused on 
neighborhoods surrounding the locations of Catholic high schools that were open in 1960. I used 
precinct-level election returns and precinct boundary maps from the 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 
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presidential elections to determine these neighborhood boundaries. Finally, I used census data 
from the 1960 and 1970s to create demographic profiles of the neighborhoods in order to control 
for the population and demographic changes that followed white flight.150 This process allowed 
me to test my first hypothesis, with closed Catholic schools in each presidential election year 
acting as the independent variable and the black population share as the dependent variable. For 
my second hypothesis, open Catholic high schools in each year serves as the independent 
variable, with Democratic vote share as the dependent variable. With these parameters, I am able 
to test for both the impact on Democratic voting patterns and demographic changes while 
controlling for confounding variables in each case. 
In order to explain the methodology as clearly as possible, it’s necessary to define terms I 
will be using going forward and the reasoning behind their uses and definitions. The term 
“parish” will serve as the neighborhoods that surround the locations of the Catholic high schools. 
According to the Official Catholic Directory, there were fifty-one Catholic high schools in the 
City of Detroit in 1960.151 That number fell to forty-nine, thirty-four, and fifteen in 1964, 1968, 
and 1972, respectively.152 The term parish was chosen purposefully instead of “school,” or even 
simply “neighborhood.” The role of the parish as an institution is the causal mechanism tying the 
issue of parochial schools and Catholic voting together with the communities they serve. The use 
of parish also reflects the influence of churches over several neighborhoods, not simply the 
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immediate surroundings of the church. And neighborhood boundaries themselves were often 
defined by those of the local parishes.153  
The use of high schools for the purposes of this thesis is two-fold. First, parochial schools 
are essential to understanding Catholic social and political behavior. But the second a more 
important reason for my methodology is that parochial high schools are essentially proxies for 
church influence. I am not interested in the student enrollment in each high school. I am not 
studying any effects of Catholic high schools’ educational or social outcomes, but rather the 
influence of the pertinent parish; the student profile of each school is therefore irrelevant. The 
largest, most financially secure, and most powerful Catholic parishes operated parochial 
elementary schools and high schools. When that power waned, or financial crises hit, high 
schools closed first, then elementary schools, before the church itself last. Thus, using Catholic 
high schools narrows the study to a smaller subset of only the most influential churches.  
The fifty-one parishes can be further split into two types. The majority of parishes are 
what I will classify as “neighborhood parishes.” These neighborhood parishes consist of high 
schools that form part of a larger community that serves the local neighborhoods. Neighborhood 
parishes consist of a church, elementary school, and the high school. These are the most vital to 
my thesis because of their more clear-cut connections to their surrounding communities. The 
other parishes are “magnet parishes.” These consist of parishes that are solely comprised of the 
high school, and they primarily cater to the school itself. These magnet parishes draw students 
and support from all over the city and from suburbs, rather than the local neighborhoods. The 
distinction between neighborhood and magnet parishes was not arbitrary but based on their 
placement in the Official Catholic Directory of 1960.154 Neighborhood parishes came from high 
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schools that were categorized under the “Clergy, Parishes, Missions and Parochial Schools” 
label, while high schools under the “High Schools, Diocesan,” or “High Schools, Private” labels 
were designated magnet parishes.155 Both still served the same purpose as community 
institutions, so my analysis counts all parishes together and also separates neighborhood 
parishes. 
The dependent variable for my first hypothesis is the black population share. This data 
comes from the 1960 and 1970 Censuses, which limits my analysis to only comparing 
demographic data the 1960, 1964, and 1968 elections to the 1972 election without any 
comparisons among elections in the 1960s. The use of the black population is due to its growth 
in the City of Detroit in the 1960s and 1970s after white flight and suburbanization accelerated. 
Using the white population share would accomplish the same goal, but the use of the black 
population share makes for an easier, more straightforward test and subsequent interpretation of 
my first hypothesis. The data for the black population share is simply the percentage of African 
Americans of the total population of these parishes according to the 1960 and 1970 Censuses.  
It is important to acknowledge an assumption inherent in utilizing demographic data. The 
white population in the City of Detroit, specifically the population used in my thesis surrounding 
Catholic high schools, is assumed to be Catholic. That is due to the prominence of Catholics in 
Detroit before suburbanization and white flight, and this simplification makes the analysis 
cleaner. The black population, therefore, is also assumed to be Protestant. Although this is the 
case for the large majority of African Americans, several prominent Catholic churches in Detroit 
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served predominantly black parishioners.156 But for the sake of simplicity, the black population 
is assumed non-Catholic for the purposes of this study. 
The dependent variable for testing my second hypothesis is Democratic vote share. This 
terminology and the focus on the Democratic, rather than Republican, vote share reflect the 
consistently high Democratic vote percentage in the City of Detroit, and the historic Democratic 
Party loyalty of Catholics. The data behind Democratic vote share is the percentage of 
Democratic votes of the total Democratic and Republican votes in the presidential elections of 
1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972. The use of only Democratic and Republican vote totals, rather than 
total votes including third-party candidates is simply due to data availability limitations. For the 
1960 and 1964 presidential elections, only the Democratic and Republican precinct-level election 
returns were accessible. Consequently, I continued to use only Democratic and Republican vote 
totals for the 1968 and 1972 presidential elections to maintain consistency throughout the data 
analysis.  
The first step in actually testing these hypotheses was to determine which areas would 
make up these fifty-one parishes. I consulted the Official Catholic Directories for 1960, 1964, 
1968, and 1972 to compile a list of Catholic high schools that were open in those respective 
years during which presidential elections also occurred. I then used ArcGIS to geocode the list of 
addresses to form the bases for the voting precincts and census tracts that would constitute my 
fifty-one parishes.  
Once the addresses were geocoded, I needed to determine which precincts’ voting returns 
would be used for each parish. I sent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the 
Michigan Secretary of State, Wayne County Clerk, and Detroit City Clerk to obtain the precinct-
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level election returns and the precinct boundary maps for the 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 
presidential elections.157 For these elections, the City of Detroit was split into larger wards, with 
varying numbers of precincts within each ward. The ward and precinct boundaries changed with 
each election, requiring four maps to be made with the geocoded high school addresses in 
ArcGIS. In order to maintain consistency and eliminate any subjective decisions from the 
process, I used a standard rule for determining the precincts included in the boundaries of each 
parish. For each election year map, I used ArcGIS to draw the precincts that included the fifty-
one high schools open in 1960. Any precinct that bordered the precinct containing each high 
school was included in the parish boundaries. This rule crossed ward boundaries and did not 
matter if a precinct were included in the boundaries of multiple parishes; this was the case for 
several precincts in each year. Once the precincts were determined for each parish in 1960, 1964, 
1968, and 1972, the next step was simply to aggregate the Democratic and Republican vote total 
for the relevant precincts and calculate the Democratic vote share for each parish in the 1960, 
1964, 1968, and 1972 presidential elections. 
Aggregating the demographic data was a similar process, albeit with its own set of 
complications and decisions. I obtained the 1960 and 1970 data from the National Historical 
Geographic Information System (NHGIS).158 The most specific data available for the time period 
is census tract-level data. To determine which census tracts should be included in the 
demographic makeup of the fifty-one parishes, I downloaded census tract shape-files of the 1960 
and 1970 Censuses, and overlaid them onto the four maps for 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 in 
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ArcGIS. I again used the locations of the Catholic high schools open in 1960 as the bases. 
However, I could not use the same rule for census tracts as I did for voting precincts because 
census tracts are much larger than most precincts and would produce inaccurate analyses. I used 
a one-third mile radius from the Catholic high schools as the range within which to include 
census tracts for each parish. This choice of one-third of a mile was essentially arbitrary but led 
to results that roughly matched the aggregation of the precincts and balanced the more spacious 
west side of Detroit with heavily dense areas downtown and along Woodward Avenue. Because 
of the limitations of only two censuses, the demographic profiles for 1960, 1964, and 1968 are 
all the same, with 1972 then having unique parish characteristics.  
Once these steps were complete, I was left with fifty-one data points – the parishes – each 
with a unique Democratic vote share and racial makeup. The final stage was the data analysis. I 
used the statistics program STATA to complete my various analyses. Through a diverse set of t-
tests and regressions utilizing the data from each presidential election year, I was able to test my 
two hypotheses. And to provide the context and critical implications of my results, I compared 
the parish demographic and voting patterns to those of the City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and 
Catholics in the United States.159 
The methodology of this thesis is of course imperfect. Although in the design of my 
thesis and methodology, I tried to cover all requisite bases as much as possible, but three issues 
loom and overshadow any other possible inconsistencies or errors I did not account for: data 
limitations, scope limitations, and confounding variables. These three issues intersect and inform 
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one another, but I will attempt to explain the problems caused be each of these and how I tried to 
overcome them. 
The most critical limitation of this study is the lack of data analyzed due simply due 
inaccessibility or nonexistence. My original research design was to study the presidential 
elections in the twenty-year period from 1960-1980, which would have expanded the analysis to 
cover a couple more of the most significant years of suburbanization. Although through the 
FOIA request I was able to obtain the election returns for the 1976 and 1980 elections, the 
precinct boundary maps for each election simply do not seem to exist. Attempting to stretch the 
FOIA request to compel assistance obtaining these maps, I contacted the Archives of the State of 
Michigan, the Burton Historical Collection at the Detroit Public Library, and the Bentley 
Historical Library at the University of Michigan; no organization had the maps or knew where 
they might be. The most consequential shortcoming as a result is the limited demographic data 
and time-series analysis possible. The 1976 and 1980 presidential elections would allow a 
comparison of six elections over twenty years and the use of three censuses. 1980 itself would 
have been supremely valuable due to the relevance of the census data for that year, which would 
have allowed for more accurate tests of the change in Democratic voting patterns due to 
accurately controlling for demographic changes in the parishes.  
This is a case study of one city over four presidential elections and twelve years. The 
results of this case study of Detroit can by no means be universally applied to every city in the 
United States, the Midwest, or even Michigan. This thesis undoubtedly has implications for 
future research and evaluating current understandings of the political history of American 
Catholics and identity politics more generally. But to use these results to claim any universal 
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causality and then apply to situations elsewhere, with their own unique demographic, political, 
and social histories, would be irresponsible and erroneous.  
Finally, confounding variables may still exist in my analyses. In looking at patterns of 
Democratic vote share, race is clearly a consequential variable that I was able to account for. 
However, income, education, family size, party platforms, and issue prominence are several 
potentially important confounding variables affecting either the population or political 
atmosphere that were likely influential in determining demographic and voting patterns.  
This thesis cannot account for these three shortcomings, but in acknowledging and 
understanding these issues, I do not aim to account for them. This study is limited in range and 
purpose by design. The historical phenomenon of Catholic voting patterns cannot be explained 
by two hypotheses in one study. But illuminating one piece of that puzzle is within reach. 
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II. 1960: Kennedy v. Nixon 
 
 
Introduction – 1960  
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Open Catholic High Schools in Detroit, 1960 
Fifty-One Catholic high schools were open in 1960.160 The geographic distribution is 
shown in Figure 1. They varied in size, influence, and neighborhood profile. Of the fifty-one 
parishes, thirty-eight were neighborhood parishes and thirteen magnet parishes. The year that 
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saw the election of the first and only Catholic American president, 1960, represents the baseline 
year that set the stage for analysis compared to the 1964, 1968, and 1972 elections.  
My data analysis, through t-tests and regressions run with STATA, makes use of 
information from all open parishes combined in addition to only the neighborhood parishes. On 
the whole, the results are comparable and often complementary. But separating them makes for a 
more thorough and nuanced analysis, with the neighborhood parishes more fundamental to my 
two hypotheses.  
 
Figure 2: 1960 Democratic Vote Share and Parish Type 
 
Figure 3: 1960 Black Population Share and Parish Type  
Figures 2 and 3 compare Democratic vote share and the black population share of magnet 
and neighborhood parishes. Neighborhood parishes are in Group 0 and magnet parishes in Group 
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1. As seen through this t-test, neighborhood parishes are 4.99% more Democratic in 1960 yet 
1.57% more African American, on average. The voting results make sense and match up with 
predicted outlooks of neighborhood and magnet parishes, but the demographics stand out. Still, 
the difference is small, allowing these baselines for the initial differences between the two types 
of parish to inform the interpretations of data going forward. Neighborhood parishes should 
reflect a more accurate Catholic community – that means lower a Democratic vote share and 
lower black population share than the City of Detroit at large, the aggregate demographics of all 
parishes open in a given year, and the parishes that had schools close before the next presidential 
election. 
An important caveat is that these t-tests in Figures 2 and 3 are not statistically significant 
at the most commonly used 95% significance level. The relevant p-values of 0.1055 and 0.4374 
are greater than 0.05, so the results are only good for giving a baseline comparison of the mean 
Democratic vote share of 1960 to add context going forward. 
 
 
Parishes and the City of Detroit, the State of Michigan, and the United 
States – 1960 
 
As the 1960 election results primarily serve to set parameters for future comparisons, 
measuring the voting and demographic information for the City of Detroit, along with the 
Democratic vote share of the State of Michigan and Catholics nationwide, provides more context 
to this baseline profile of Detroit Catholic voting patterns.   
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Table 1: 1960 Parishes and the City of Detroit161  
Table 1 compares the Democratic vote share, the black population share, and the white 
population share in the City of Detroit, the fifty-one parishes with open Catholic high schools, 
and the thirty-eight neighborhood parishes in 1960. The 1960 Census allows for accurate 
demographic information for this election year, giving definitive demographic profiles. 28.87% 
of Detroit’s population, 30.35% of all parishes’ population, and 30.75% of neighborhood 
parishes’ population were African American in 1960. At first, this might seem counterintuitive 
and contradictory to both my first hypothesis and prior assertions. But 1960 is simply the 
baseline year for future comparisons. The demographic outlook of 1960 is less important to my 
first hypothesis and thesis than the demographics of the parishes that had schools close by 1972, 
with the 1970 Census providing updated information. 
The City of Detroit voted 70.97% Democratic, while all parishes voted 74.84% and 
neighborhood parishes voted 76.11% Democratic. Likewise, the Democratic vote share also 
appears anomalous at first – at that’s because it essentially is. The 1960 election of Kennedy – 
the first Catholic – likely inspired greater energy and mobilization in the Catholic communities. 
This explains the increased Democratic voting in the parishes over Detroit as a whole. 
Additionally, 1960 is before the full effects of white flight took shape and before Nixon’s 
southern strategy further realigned the political parties. Nevertheless, the difference is only 
3.87% and 5.14% for all parishes and neighborhood parishes, respectively. This table essentially 
                                                 
161 County of Wayne (Mich.). Board of Canvassers. “Statement of Election Returns,” (November 6, 1960). 
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presents the City of Detroit and Catholic parishes as similar demographically and politically in 
1960, setting up future comparisons with evolving demographics and voting patterns. 
 
 
Table 2: 1960 Parishes and the State of Michigan162 
Table 2 focuses only on the Democratic vote shares of all parishes and neighborhood 
parishes contrasted with that of the State of Michigan. Reflecting the razor-thin vote margin of 
the election nationwide, Michigan only voted 51.01% Democratic. The Catholic parishes 
decimated this figure. All parishes had a 23.83% increase in Democratic vote share, while 
neighborhood parishes saw an even larger 25.10% increase compared to the State of Michigan. 
This information does little to prove either of my hypotheses but helps establish the Democratic 
voting tendencies of Catholics in Detroit and provide a deeper context for these political patterns. 
 
Table 3: 1960 Parishes and Catholics in the United States.163 U.S. Catholic voting data is an average of Gallup Poll and ANES 
election estimates. 
Finally, table 3 presents the same comparison but with Catholic Democratic vote share 
nationwide. Catholics nationwide had the highest 1960 Democratic vote share of any group at 
80.00%. Unlike the City of Detroit or the State of Michigan, this translates to a 5.16% and 3.89% 
decrease in Democratic vote share among all parishes and neighborhood parishes, respectively. 
This is possibly simply due to greater excitement and engagement among cities with larger 
                                                 
162 Haddad, “Here’s How Michigan Has Voted in Every Presidential Election since 1836.”  
163 “Presidential Vote of Catholics.” 
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Catholic populations. Detroit also had a historically small – though relatively powerful – Irish 
Catholic population, while its Polish Catholic population constituted the majority of Catholics.164 
This also suggests that Catholics who had already moved to suburban or rural communities by 
1960 still exhibited Democratic loyalty. This is supported by some case studies of Catholic 
political behavior at the time.165 Most importantly, however, this information sets the initial 
Catholic Democratic vote share so high that the future drop off is significant and therefore 
invites explanations for the precipitous decrease. 
 
 
Conclusion – 1960 
 
In many ways, the 1960 presidential election is atypical. The higher Democratic vote 
share among Catholics nationwide than either category of parishes or the City of Detroit is 
unique in this thesis. However, the 1964, 1968, and 1972 elections are also exceptional in 
different ways, with curiosities in the data throughout. This 1960 data sets an important 
benchmark, though, with initial profiles necessary for future comparison. In 1960, Catholic 
parishes with open high schools were predominantly white and overwhelmingly Democratic. 
How these trends change as parishes’ schools close and neighborhoods diversify will tell the 
story of the evolution Catholic voting and demographic patterns through these four elections. 
 
                                                 
164 Marger, “Ethnic Succession in Detroit Politics,” 347-352. 
165 Greer, “Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party,” 611-625; Penning, “Changing Partisanship and Issue Stands 
among American Catholics, 29-49; Rae, “Class and Culture,” 629-650. 
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III. 1964: Johnson v. Goldwater 
 
 
Introduction – 1964 
 
 
Figure 4: Map of Open Catholic High Schools in Detroit, 1964 
Of the fifty-one Catholic high schools that were open in 1960, only two closed by the 
1964 presidential election, shown in Figure 4.166 Both of the schools that closed were in 
neighborhood parishes. This makes the data analysis and comparisons between the 1960 and 
                                                 
166 “Archdiocese of Detroit School Records;” “List of Active and Defunct High Schools in the Archdiocese of 
Detroit;” The Official Catholic Directory for the Year of Our Lord 1964. 
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1964 elections helpful for completing the profiles of Catholic political behavior and 
neighborhood demographics in Detroit. That both closings were in neighborhood parishes also 
adds credence to the greater role neighborhood parishes play in my hypotheses. Neighborhood 
parishes are more reflective of changing demographics and evolving Catholic voting patterns 
than magnet parishes.  
 
Figure 5: 1964 Black Population Share, All Parishes 
 
Figure 6: 1964 Black Population Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
Figures 5 and 6 compare the black population share in parishes with schools that have 
closed and are still open in 1964. Group 0 consists of the closed parishes, while Group 1 is open. 
Figures 5 and 6 compare all parishes and neighborhood parishes, respectively. In both Figures, 
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the average black population share is far greater in parishes where the schools have closed. With 
all parishes in Figure 5 the difference is 27.16%, and it is 27.12% for just neighborhood parishes 
in Figure 6. The caveat here is that these t-tests use the same 1960 Census data as 1960 and 
1968, due to data availability limitations. The p-values of 0.11 in Figure 5 and 0.09 in Figure 6 
are also not statistically significant. Nevertheless, important information is transmitted here. 
These Figures show the relationship that parishes with open Catholic high schools have with 
changing demographics. Parishes where schools closed led to higher concentrations of African 
Americans. This provides early support for my first hypothesis. 
 
Figure 7: 1964 Democratic Vote Share, All parishes 
 
Figure 8: 1964 Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes 
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Figure 9: 1960-1964 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes 
 
Figure 10: 1960-1964 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
Figures 7-10 show the voting profile of the parishes open in 1964. Similar to Figures 5 
and 6, these t-tests are not statistically significant, but still chronicle early relationships between 
open schools and voting patterns that set the stage for more meticulous tests of my second 
hypothesis. Figures 7 and 8 show the mean 1964 Democratic vote share of all parishes and 
neighborhood parishes, respectively. And Figure 9 and 10 do the same but use the percent 
change in Democratic vote share from 1960 to 1964.  
As seen with Figures 7 and 8 in the two parishes that had schools close by 1964, mean 
Democratic vote share was larger than in the parishes with open schools. This follows my second 
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hypothesis, as declining Catholic Democratic voting patterns are still expected along with 
increased Democratic voting as neighborhoods become more African American. More 
interestingly, Figures 9 and 10 show that the parishes with closed schools experienced only an 
average 0.70% increase in Democratic vote share from 1960 to 1964, while parishes with open 
schools saw an average of 16.26% increase for all parishes and 17.08% for neighborhood 
parishes. This discrepancy also follows from my hypotheses and matches the demographic data. 
Those parishes with a high initial black population share were already more Democratic and 
therefore had less room to increase in 1964. Although these comparisons and t-tests are not 
statistically significant and do not provide concrete evidence for my hypotheses, they again 
provide more context for these parishes going forward.  
 
 
Parishes and the City of Detroit, the State of Michigan, and the United 
States – 1964 
 
As with 1960, comparing the parish voting data with the City of Detroit, State of 
Michigan, and Catholics in America go further to create the profiles that characterize my 
hypotheses. 
 
Table 4: 1964 Parishes and the City of Detroit167 
                                                 
167 County of Wayne (Mich.). Board of Canvassers. “Statement of Election Returns,” (November 3, 1964). 
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Table 4 again compares the demographic and voting characteristics of the City of Detroit, 
all parishes with open schools, and neighborhood parishes with open schools in 1964. Although 
the demographic data is still just from 1960, Table 4 expands upon the t-tests in Figures 5 and 6. 
Most significant about Table 4 is that neighborhood parishes have higher Democratic vote shares 
and higher black population shares than the city at large and all parishes together. Neighborhood 
parishes were more Democratic than the city overall by 5.01%. This may be chalked up to the 
wave election of 1964, which might have particularly inspired Catholics with President 
Kennedy’s assassination christening him a Democratic martyr. Nevertheless, the city, all 
parishes, and neighborhood parishes still do not show vast difference in demographic or political 
outlooks. Table 4 mostly serves to continue expanding the profiles of these parishes. 
 
Table 5: 1964 Parishes and the State of Michigan168 
Table 5 makes the same voting comparison but with the State of Michigan rather than the 
City of Detroit. Here, the difference is stark. Although Michigan voted 15.83% more Democratic 
in 1964 than 1960, that number is far lower than either measure of parishes. All parishes with 
open schools voted 17.18% more Democratic than the state, while neighborhood parishes voted 
19.01% more Democratic. These numbers show the beginning of the gap in Democratic vote 
share that Detroit Catholics will maintain compared to much of the nation. Although Democratic 
vote share declines in parishes in 1968 and 1972, the voting patterns remain steadier and more 
consistently Democratic than Michigan and Catholics nationwide. 
                                                 
168 Haddad, “Here’s How Michigan Has Voted in Every Presidential Election since 1836.” 
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Table 6: 1964 Parishes and Catholics in the United States169 
Table 6 once again follows the pattern by comparing parishes with US Catholics. 
American Catholics as a whole differed slightly from the Detroit parishes in Democratic voting, 
with a decline of 2.50% from 1960 to 1964. With a 77.50% Democratic vote share among 
Catholics nationwide, Detroit Catholics in all parishes outperformed that by 6.52% and in 
neighborhood parishes by 8.35%. This is the first sign of the stark divergence again seen in 1968 
and 1972 between Detroit parishes with open schools and Catholics nationwide. A slight 
decrease in Catholic Democratic voting could be expected without a Catholic leading the ticket 
as in 1960, but only this slight increase amid a Democratic wave was more telling of coming 
trends. 
 
Table 7: 1960-1964 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes 
 
Table 8: 1960-1964 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
Tables 7 and 8 dive deeper into these evolutions, showing the percent change in 
Democratic vote share among all parishes and neighborhood parishes from 1960 to 1964. The 
U.S. Catholic percent change was calculated simply from the 1960 and 1964 data, the parish 
variable was run as a t-test in STATA, and the parish with control variable was run as a 
regression through STATA. Those regressions tested the percent change in Democratic vote 
share from 1960 to 1964 regressed to parishes with an open high school, the black population 
                                                 
169 “Presidential Vote of Catholics.” 
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share, and the total population. U.S. Catholic Democratic vote share declined by 3.13%. Without 
controls, parishes with open Catholic high schools saw increases of 16.20% and 17.30% for all 
parishes and neighborhood parishes, respectively. But those figures decrease to 9.55% and 
11.83% when controlling for those confounding variables. Similar to other STATA tests, none of 
these regressions produced statistically significant results, but accomplish the same goals as 
those earlier tests. These simply show the data in another light, that the trend of Catholic voting 
nationwide contrasts with parishes with open high schools in Detroit. 
 
 
Conclusion – 1964 
 
The data for 1964 does not add much to 1960 but allows for progress in evolving the 
profiles of these parishes and how they interact with rapid shifts in demographics and voting 
patterns. The most important takeaway from the 1964 presidential elections is the gap between 
national Catholic voting results and the parish Democratic vote shares. Those differences 
foreshadow the more significant tests and analyses in 1968 and 1972. 
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IV. 1968: Humphrey v. Nixon 
 
 
Introduction – 1968 
 
 
Figure 11: Map of Open Catholic High Schools in Detroit, 1968 
The presidential election of 1968 was the first after the Detroit uprising in 1967. The 
aftermath of that event, likely more than any other, encapsulates the mindset of the height of 
white flight in Detroit. This aligns with the steep decline in the number of parishes with open 
Catholic schools in the 1968 presidential election. As illustrated by Figure 11, only thirty-four 
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parishes remained with schools – twenty-six of them neighborhood parishes.170 This drop in 
schools and further distance from the 1960 election allow for deeper analyses of these parishes 
and how they fit into the broader trends around them.  
 
Figure 12: 1968 Black Population Share, All Parishes 
 
Figure 13: 1968 Black Population Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
Figures 12 and 13 present more t-tests of the black population share of all parishes and 
neighborhood parishes with schools open and closed in 1968. Continuing the trend of Figures 5 
and 6, the parishes with schools no longer open have much higher mean black population shares 
in 1968. For all parishes, the mean black population percentage is 31.51% higher where schools 
                                                 
170 “Archdiocese of Detroit School Records;” “List of Active and Defunct High Schools in the Archdiocese of 
Detroit;” The Official Catholic Directory for the Year of Our Lord 1968. 
 56 
  
have closed, and that mean difference is 32.69% in neighborhood parishes. These two Figures 
are still using the 1960 Census demographic data, but with greater sorting due to distance of time 
and the trends continuing, these results are more meaningful. The relevant p-values for Figures 
12 and 13 are 0.0001 and 0.0002, respectively, which are both lower than the standard .05 
significance level. Figures 12 and 13, therefore, illustrate that among all parishes and 
neighborhood parishes, the mean black population percentage where schools have closed by 
1968 is statistically significantly higher than where Catholic high schools remained open. These 
Figures present the first concrete, statistically significant evidence supporting my first 
hypothesis. This correlation does not, however, presume causality. These Figures use 1960 data, 
which suggests that the initial demographic profiles of parishes are important if not predictive. 
But these results also imply that white flight causality is at least two-sided.  
 
Figure 14: 1968 Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes 
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Figure 15: 1968 Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
 
Figure 16: 1960-1968 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes 
 
Figure 17: 1960-1968 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
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Figure 18: 1964-1968 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes 
 
Figure 19: 1964-1968 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
Figures 14-19 show the voting patterns of the parishes still open in 1968, with the longer 
time length allowing for deeper analyses. Figures 14 and 15 are simple t-tests of the Democratic 
vote share in all parishes and neighborhoods parishes comparing those with schools closed and 
still open. Figures 16, 17, 18, and 19 present similar comparisons, except with the percent change 
in Democratic vote share from 1960 to 1968 for Figures 16 and 17 and from 1964 to 1968 for 
Figures 18 and 19. Unlike the t-tests of Figures 12 and 13, Figures 14-19 are not statistically 
significant. Nevertheless, the trends they continue to illuminate set the stage for the final 
comparison in the next chapter with 1972.  
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The trend of areas with closed schools becoming more Democratic continues in Figures 
14 and 15, with the difference in average Democratic vote share 6.09% and 5.96% for all 
parishes and neighborhood parishes, respectively. And with p-values of 0.061 and 0.081, these 
are close to statistically significant, and even would be with the less-common significance level 
of 0.10. Consequently, Figures 14 and 15 support my second hypothesis.  
Figures 16-19 tell that Democratic voting in these parishes is not as strong in 1968 as 
1964, yet still higher than 1960 using percent change in Democratic vote share from 1960 to 
1968 for Figures 16 and 17 and from 1964 to 1968 for Figures 18 and 19. Similar to Figures 9 
and 10, Figures 16 and 17 show that from 1960 to 1968, parishes with open schools actually 
increased Democratic vote share regardless of measuring all parishes or only neighborhood 
parishes. These results add more evidence that areas where schools had closed were more 
Democratic to begin in 1960.  
Conversely, Figures 18 and 19 show that while parishes where schools closed by 1968 
saw increases in Democratic vote share over 1964, parishes with schools remaining open fell. 
This decline was greater when comparing all parishes, however. The average Democratic vote 
share percent change was -2.84% for all parishes with open schools, but only -1.23% for 
neighborhood parishes with schools. Neither result is statistically significant, but neighborhood 
parishes continue to remain distinct from – and slightly more Democratic than – the data of all 
parishes. Again like Figures 9 and 10, the results of areas with schools closed in Figures 18 and 
19 reflect the demographic outlooks of those areas in Figures 12 and 13.  
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Parishes and the City of Detroit, the State of Michigan, and the United 
States – 1968 
 
The pattern is becoming more difficult to deny with each election. Where parishes’ 
schools are closing, the areas are exhibiting higher black population shares and higher 
Democratic voting percentages. Parishes that are maintaining schools, especially neighborhood 
parishes, are staying whiter and slowly becoming less Democratic. 
 
Table 9: 1968 Parishes and the City of Detroit171 
Table 9 is another juxtaposition of parish and Detroit demographic and voting data. Once 
again, both groups of parishes with schools open outperformed the City of Detroit in Democratic 
vote share – all parishes by 2.13% and neighborhood parishes by 4.17%. Both groupings of 
parishes have become much whiter than the city as a whole by 1968 as well. This is the final 
election to still use the 1960 Census, so the data here is not as accurate as 1960 or even 1964. 
Nevertheless, Table 9 builds off Figures 12-15. Parishes with schools open, especially 
neighborhood parishes, are less African American than the rest of the city or areas with former 
Catholic high schools. This Table shows some decline in Democratic vote share among Detroit 
parishes, though the decline is far from that of Michigan or U.S. Catholics. These conclusions 
add to the cases for both of my hypotheses. 
 
                                                 
171 County of Wayne (Mich.). Board of Canvassers. “Statement of Election Returns,” (November 5, 1968). 
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Table 10: 1968 Parishes and the State of Michigan172 
Table 10, like Tables 2 and 5, compare the parishes with the State of Michigan’s 
Democratic voting. Michigan experienced a sharp decline in Democratic voting from 1964 to 
1968 of 13.09%. All parishes and neighborhood parishes had Democratic vote shares 26.00% 
and 28.04% higher than the State of Michigan. These results follow the trends of Tables 2 and 5. 
The gap that first arose in 1964, with Michigan trending downward regarding Democratic vote 
share and parishes with open schools are remaining strong against that tide, is even more clear in 
1968. 
 
Table 11: 1968 Parishes and Catholics in the United States173 
More immediately relevant to this thesis, Table 11 contrasts Catholic Democratic vote 
share among the parishes and Catholics nationwide. Perhaps starker than any previous table, 
American Catholics voted only 57.50% Democratic in 1968 – a difference of -20% from 1964. 
This decline bluntly stands opposed to the 1968 results of all parishes and neighborhoods 
parishes. Parishes in general voted 22.25% more Democratic than Catholics across the nation, 
while neighborhood parishes voted 24.29% more Democratic. Although Catholics as a whole 
still voted Democratic in 1968, the slight decrease in 1964 turned out to be the top of a slippery 
                                                 
172 Haddad, “Here’s How Michigan Has Voted in Every Presidential Election since 1836.” 
173 “Presidential Vote of Catholics.” 
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slope. Yet these Detroit parishes have resisted similar patterns, lending strong evidence in 
support of my second hypothesis.  
 
Table 12: 1960-1968; 1964-1968 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes 
 
Table 13: 1960-1968; 1964-1968 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
Like Tables 7 and 8, Tables 12 and 13 present a subtler interpretation of these voting 
evolutions. Looking at all parishes with open schools in Table 12 and only neighborhood 
parishes in Table 13, both compare the percent change in democratic vote share from 1960 to 
1968 and 1964 to 1968. The variables were calculated the same way as in Tables 7 and 8, using 
the US Catholic voting data and t-tests and regressions in STATA.  
From 1960 to 1968, Catholics nationwide experienced a -28.13% change in Democratic 
vote share. In the same span of elections, all Detroit parishes with open schools saw a 3.01% 
increase, and neighborhood parishes had a 3.85% increase. When controlling for the black 
population and total population, these figures jump to 6.58% and 9.86%.  
From 1964 to 1968, the -25.81% change in US Catholic Democratic vote share contrasts 
again with the changes of parishes. When not controlling, all parishes had a 5.77% decrease, and 
just a 0.11% decrease with controls. Neighborhood parishes fared even better, with a 3.22% 
decrease without controls and a 2.51% increase with controls.  
None of four t-tests or regressions in Tables 12 and 13 are statistically significant, but 
they still tell important parts of this story. Not only are parishes in general much more 
Democratic than the trends of American Catholics broadly speaking, but neighborhood parishes 
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exhibit even stronger Democratic tendencies. The results in Tables 12 and 13 present the most 
compelling support yet for my second hypothesis. Neighborhood parishes with schools still open 
– signifying the power and influence of the parish itself – are maintaining their Democratic 
profile while the trends of the State of Michigan and Catholics across American rush the 
opposite way. 
 
 
Conclusion – 1968 
 
With 1968 adding stock to the initially insignificant results of 1964, the patterns are 
taking shape. 1960 and 1964 created profiles of parishes – in general and neighborhood-specific 
– along with the City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and U.S. Catholics. 1968 proved the 
importance of time series data for analyzing how the results fit together. The hints of trends in 
1964 are expanded upon in 1968, setting up the consequential analysis of the 1972 election. 
What is becoming clear is that both of my hypotheses seem to be supported by data. With the 
updated demographic information of the 1970 Census and a fourth election to scrutinize, the next 
chapter of the 1972 election is the most critical to rigorous tests of my hypotheses and 
understanding the puzzle of Catholic voting evolutions. 
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V. 1972: McGovern v. Nixon 
 
 
Introduction – 1972 
 
 
Figure 20: Map of Open Catholic High Schools in Detroit, 1972 
By 1972, white flight and suburbanization had firmly taken foot and changed the City of 
Detroit, which Figure 20 puts into contrast with the maps of Figures 1, 4, and 11. Of the fifty-one 
Catholic high schools open in 1960, only fifteen were still open by the 1972 presidential election 
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– and only nine neighborhood parishes.174 The stark decline from 1964 to 1968 continued into 
1972, which grants further importance to this analysis of the impacts of these schools closing.  
 
Figure 21: 1972 Black Population Share, All Parishes 
 
Figure 22: 1972 Black Population Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
Figures 21 and 22 show the black population share in 1972 for parishes with open 
Catholic high schools, with Figure 21 dealing with all parishes and Figure 22 only neighborhood 
parishes. With the 1970 Census providing updated demographic information, these t-tests are 
more accurate than those in 1964 and 1968. The black population in areas where Catholic high 
schools had closed by 1972 were either 45.44% blacker or 48.71% on average, whether for all 
                                                 
174 “Archdiocese of Detroit School Records;” “List of Active and Defunct High Schools in the Archdiocese of 
Detroit;” The Official Catholic Directory for the Year of Our Lord 1972. 
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parishes or just neighborhood parishes. The relevant p-values for Figures 21 and 22 are both 
0.00, meaning these differences in the black population are statistically significant. Similar to 
Figures 12 and 13 in 1968, this data provides statistically significant support of my first 
hypothesis, that white flight was exacerbated by the closing of Catholic high schools. The 
updated census data of 1970 also means that the causality is less ambiguous than with the 1964 
and 1968 data. With more current demographic information, this data no longer reflects the 
initial conditions of the 1960 black population shares in these parishes.  
 
Figure 23: 1972 Effect of All Parishes on Black Population Share 
 
Figure 24: 1972 Effect of Neighborhood Parishes on Black Population Share 
Figures 23 and 24, however, go even further by comparing the effects of parishes on the 
black population share in 1972, holding the initial conditions of the 1960 black population share 
fixed. Figure 23, using all parishes, shows that the mean black population share in open parishes 
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was 22.24% lower than in parishes where schools had closed by 1972. In Figure 24 this becomes 
a mean 25.37% difference between open and closed neighborhood parishes. These Figures again 
illustrate the variances between parish categories. That both Figures 23 and 24 had larger 
increases in the black population share among parishes with schools closed, lends further 
credence to my first hypothesis.  
These results suggest that the initial conditions of 1960 were not entirely predictive of 
school closings and future demographic and political profiles of these areas. The fate of 
parochial high schools had clear effects on the demographic outlook of their parishes. And with 
p-values of 0.007 and 0.003, both Figures produced statistically significant results. Figures 23 
and 24 therefore appear to uncover more evidence surrounding my first hypothesis. The large 
increase in the black population share seen is not simply a reflection of the demographic changes 
from white flight and suburbanization of the 1960s and early 1970s in Detroit. Whether parishes 
remained open or closed by 1972 had drastic effects on these patterns. White flight no longer 
seems exogenous to the status of parochial schools. 
Figures 25 and 26 compare the same parishes’ Democratic vote shares in 1972. 
Continuing earlier trends, in both Figures the areas with closed Catholic high schools have 
higher mean Democratic vote shares in 1972 – all parishes were 28.94% more Democratic and 
neighborhood parishes 29.69% more Democratic. Both p-values of 0.00 and 0.0001, 
respectively, make these differences statistically significant. As seen in Figures 21, 22, 25, and 
26 these communities were significantly more African American than parishes with open high 
schools and consequently more Democratic, as expected. 
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Figure 25: 1972 Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes 
 
Figure 26: 1972 Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
 
Figure 27: 1960-1972 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes 
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Figure 28: 1960-1972 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
 
Figure 29: 1964-1972 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes 
 
Figure 30: 1964-1972 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
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Figure 31: 1968-1972 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes 
 
Figure 32: 1968-1972 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
Figures 27-32 illustrate the most important t-tests for this thesis. The t-tests compare the 
mean percent change in Democratic vote share between areas with closed or open Catholic high 
schools in 1972, similar to Figures 25 and 26. These Figures cover the percent changes from 
1960, 1964, and 1968 to 1972 in Figures 27 and 28, Figures 29 and 30, and Figures 31 and 32, 
respectively. Figures 27, 29, and 31 compare all parishes, while neighborhood parishes are 
covered in Figures 28, 30, and 32. Each of these Figures produces statistically significant results 
at the 95% significance level, with p-values of 0.0007, 0.00, and 0.0008 for Figures 27, 29, and 
31, and p-values of 0.0023, 0.0009, and 0.0026 for Figures 28, 30, and 32. Therefore, the percent 
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changes in Democratic vote share in these Figures provide statistically significant insight into the 
evolving voting patterns of Catholics, despite not utilizing controls for confounding variables.  
As shown in Figures 27 and 28, from 1960 to 1972, areas with open Catholics schools 
had -12.79% and -14.17% changes in mean Democratic vote shares for all and neighborhood 
parishes, compared to increases of 13.15% and 14.69% for parishes where schools had closed by 
1972. From 1964 to 1972, as in Figures 29 and 30, the differences are even wider. All parishes 
and neighborhood parishes saw -27.53% and -27.56% changes in mean Democratic voting where 
schools were still open, while areas with closed schools had 3.98% and 3.80% increases. Finally, 
Figure 31 shows that from only 1968 to 1972 average Democratic vote share among all parishes 
with open schools changed by -17.59% but slightly increased by 0.74% where schools had 
closed. And as in Figure 32, neighborhood parishes with open schools’ average Democratic vote 
share fell by 18.63% but increased by 1.36% in areas with closed schools.  
These results build off Figures 25 and 26, along with the data from the three prior 
elections. Communities where Catholic schools closed saw increases in the black population 
share and subsequent increases in Democratic vote share. This pattern bears itself in statistically 
significant ways in Figures 25-32. Whether taking the 1972 alone or comparing the percent 
change from previous elections, the pattern holds. Democratic vote share fell in parishes that still 
had Catholic high schools operating, regardless of comparing all parishes or simply 
neighborhood parishes. 
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Figure 33: 1960-1972 Effect of All Parishes on Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share 
 
Figure 34: 1960-1972 Effect of Neighborhood Parishes on Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share 
 
Figure 35: 1964-1972 Effect of All Parishes on Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share 
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Figure 36: 1964-1972 Effect of Neighborhood Parishes on Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share 
 
Figure 37: 1968-1972 Effect of All Parishes on Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share 
 
Figure 38: 1968-1972 Effect of Neighborhood Parishes on Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share 
The results of Figures 27-32 should not be ignored, but without controlling for 
confounding variables, their results are potentially biased. Thus, Figures 33-38 relay the results 
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of regressions of Democratic vote share percent changes from 1960, 1964, and 1968 to 1972 that 
control for the percent change of the black population from 1960 to 1972 and the total population 
percent change from 1960 to 1972. Figures 33 and 34 test the percent change from 1960 to 1972, 
with 1964 to 1972 covered by Figures 35 and 36, and 1968 to 1972 by Figures 37 and 38. All 
parishes are tested by Figures 33, 35, and 37, with neighborhood parishes in Figures 34, 36, and 
38. The regression results for all parishes in Figures 33, 35, and 37 are all statistically significant 
with p-values of 0.002, 0.00, and 0.005. Similarly, the results of Figures 34, 36, and 38 are 
statistically significant with p-values of 0.003 for Figures 34 and 36 and 0.006 for Figure 38. The 
statistical significance for all six of these regressions in Figures 33-38 provides the strongest 
support for my second hypothesis and goes a long way toward firmly establishing the extent of 
the decline in Catholic Democratic vote share in Detroit. 
The results of these regressions in Figure 33 reveals that among all parishes that still 
operated Catholic high schools in 1972, Democratic vote share decreased by 25.51% since 1960 
compared to those with closed schools. Figure 34 shows that decline becoming 30.43% for only 
neighborhood parishes. As in Figures 35 and 36, open Catholic schools in 1972 saw Democratic 
vote share decreases of 30.22% and 32.78% for all parishes and neighborhood parishes, 
respectively, compared to closed parishes. Figure 37 shows that among all parishes and 
compared to those with closed schools, open Catholic high schools in 1972 led to a decrease of 
16.93% in Democratic vote share from 1968 to 1972, with a -20.52% difference in only 
neighborhood parishes according to Figure 38. 
Each of these results provides further evidence that Catholic voting patterns diverged 
drastically from their historic Democratic preferences during the 1960s and early 1970s. While 
Democratic vote shares increased in the same areas that had Catholic high schools open in 1960 
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but had closed by 1972, parishes that still operated Catholic high schools in 1972 experienced 
drastic declines in Democratic voting from 1960, 1964, and 1968. These results follow the trends 
of the earlier elections and don’t seem to immediately challenge the traditional story of 
increasingly split Catholic voting patterns.  
The results of the Figures in this chapter illuminate the final characteristics of the profile 
of these fifty-one parishes that had open high schools in 1960. The demographic and political 
patterns over the twelve years and four elections from 1960 to 1972 is now complete and ready 
for comparisons with the City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and U.S. Catholics. The context 
gained from these comparisons highlights the importance of these parishes to stemming the tide 
of both white flight and divergent Catholic voting patterns. The directions of these waves are 
now clear as well. Where Catholic schools closed, the black population share and Democratic 
vote share rose alike, while parishes with open schools remained far whiter and became less 
Democratic. 
 
 
Parishes and the City of Detroit, the State of Michigan, and the United 
States – 1972 
 
 
Table 14: 1972 Parishes and the City of Detroit175 
                                                 
175 County of Wayne (Mich.). Board of Canvassers. “Statement of Election Returns,” (November 7, 1972). 
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Table 14 shows that the trends of earlier elections finally resulted in a much larger 
Democratic vote share in Detroit than among Catholic parishes in 1972. The City of Detroit was 
13.13% more Democratic than all parishes with open schools, and 12.72% more Democratic than 
neighborhood parishes. These differences reflect the demographic makeup of the city compared 
to the parishes. According to the 1970 Census, the City of Detroit was 42.06% black, while 
parishes were just 13.89% or 9.47% African American if comparing all parishes or neighborhood 
parishes.176 As a community’s black population share rose, so did its Democratic vote share. But 
importantly for my thesis, neighborhood parishes were both whiter than the city at large and all 
parishes combined, yet slightly more Democratic than all parishes but of course less Democratic 
than the rest of Detroit. 
 
Table 15: 1972 Parishes and the State of Michigan177 
Table 15, as in Tables 2, 5, and 10 before, simply provides more context of the voting 
patterns of these parishes when compared areas that are less Democratic but more 
demographically similar to them than the rest of the City of Detroit in 1972. This election was 
the first to feature a Michigan Democratic vote share less than 50%, with neighborhood parishes 
voting 16.07% more Democratic and all parishes 15.66% more Democratic than the State of 
Michigan. As both categories of parish were still very white, evidence in favor of white 
Catholics remaining Democratic with the operation of an urban Catholic high school per my 
second hypothesis seems apparent. 
                                                 
176 Manson, Schroeder, Van Riper, and Ruggles, “National Historical Geographic Information System.” 
177 Haddad, “Here’s How Michigan Has Voted in Every Presidential Election since 1836.” 
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Table 16: 1972 Parishes and Catholics in the United States178 
Table 16 shows similar data as Table 15, which is critical for my second hypothesis. As 
with the State of Michigan, 1972 was the first election that Catholics voted less than 50% 
Democratic. The difference in Democratic vote share was 15.23% for neighborhood parishes and 
only a slightly smaller 14.82% for all parishes. These differences follow from the 1968 election, 
and solidify the steep, downward Democratic trend of Catholics nationwide contrasted with the 
still relatively high Democratic vote share among Catholic parishes with open high schools in 
Detroit in 1972. Table 16 directly supports my second hypothesis, putting the differences 
between Detroit Catholics and US Catholics right next to one another. 
 
Table 17: 1960-1972; 1964-1972; 1968-1972 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes 
 
Table 18: 1960-1972; 1964-1972; 1968-1972 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes 
As Tables 12 and 13 did for Table 11 regarding the 1968 election and Tables 7 and 8 for 
1964, Tables 17 and 18 further quantify the divergence between Catholics nationwide and in 
Detroit. Table 17 covers all parishes and their percent changes in Democratic vote share from 
1960, 1964, and 1968 to 1972 compared with Catholics nationwide, while Table 18 does the 
same with only neighborhood parishes. Both Tables again use the U.S. Catholic voting data and 
                                                 
178 “Presidential Vote of Catholics.” 
percent change US Catholics Parishes Parishes w/Controls p-value p-control
1960-1972 -45.63% -25.94% -25.51% 0.0007 0.0020
1964-1972 -43.87% -31.51% -30.22% 0.0000 0.0000
1968-1972 -24.35% -18.33% -16.93% 0.0008 0.0050
All Parishes
percent change US Catholics Parishes Parishes w/Controls p-value p-control
1960-1972 -45.63% -28.87% -30.43% 0.0023 0.0030
1964-1972 -43.87% -31.37% -32.78% 0.0009 0.0030
1968-1972 -24.35% -19.99% -20.52% 0.0026 0.0060
Neighborhood Parishes
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STATA for the results. The parish percent changes without controls and p-values come from the 
t-tests of Figures 27-32, and the percent changes with controls and corresponding p-values are 
drawn from Figures 33-38. Again, all of the results aggregated in Tables 17 and 18 are 
statistically significance. Thus, these comparisons in Tables 17 and 18 provide vital evidence in 
favor of my second hypothesis. 
Catholics nationwide had stark declines in Democratic vote shares through the 1972 
presidential elections. From 1960 to 1972, this was a -45.63% change. From 1964 to 1972, this 
change was -43.87%. Finally, from just 1968 to 1972, there was a substantial -24.35% change in 
American Catholic Democratic vote shares. These figures dwarf the corresponding declines 
among parishes with open high schools in 1972. Among all parishes, those decreases in percent 
change of Democratic vote share are 25.94%, 31.51% and 18.33% from 1960, 1964, and 1968, 
respectively, to 1972. And for just neighborhood parishes, those percent changes drop to  
-25.51%, -30.22%, and -16.93%.  
Despite these massive declines across the board, Democratic vote shares of parishes with 
schools open in 1972 were still much higher than that of Catholics nationwide. Even when 
accounting for the demographic makeup of the areas, Catholic Democratic vote share decreased 
less in these Detroit parishes than across the nation. Tables 16, 17, and 18 succinctly sum up my 
second hypothesis and the accompanying implications. Even though where parishes were large 
and strong enough to still operate Catholic high schools Democratic vote share assuredly 
declined among Catholics in Detroit, the difference is far from the extent seen nationwide. 
 
 
 79 
  
Conclusion – 1972 
 
The 1972 presidential election serves as the last point of statistical analysis for this thesis. 
This election is vital to my hypothesis by allowing for time series tests of demographic and 
voting shifts since 1960. From these tests came the most statistically significant results that 
finished the portraits of these parishes that started with the 1960 presidential election. The 
evolutions of the racial makeup and party preferences of these areas where parishes operated a 
Catholic high school in 1960 were fully realized. This allowed for more accurate comparisons 
between these parishes, the City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and Catholics throughout 
America.  
The t-tests and regressions run that cemented this data – increased black population 
shares where Catholic high schools closed and declining Democratic vote shares where those 
schools remained open – established the trends implicated. The data for Detroit, Michigan, and 
the American Catholics already existed, and much analysis was unnecessary outside of simple 
comparisons. Their voting patterns from 1960 to 1972 were not mysteries. The specificity of the 
demographic and political characterizations of these parishes – down to census tracts and 
precinct-level election returns – required thorough statistical analysis. That analysis compiled a 
vast amount of election and demographic data to demonstrate the impact of Catholic parishes on 
their communities. With statistically significant results, clear correlations among other tests, and 
stark contrasts with the City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and Catholics nationwide, the 1972 
election provided the last piece of the puzzle that illustrates the effects of Catholic parishes as 
community institutions and tools for political mobilization. 
 
 80 
  
VI. Twelve Years Later: The Effects of White Flight, 
Parochial School Closings, Catholic Democratic 
Rejection in Detroit 
 
 
Overview of Results 
 
 The t-tests, regressions, and tables point to the same conclusion: the closing of Catholic 
high schools had profound effects on the surrounding neighborhoods. The trends illustrated from 
1960 to 1972 for all parishes are even more pronounced when limiting analyses to neighborhood 
parishes. White flight and Democratic party decline among Catholics – both phenomena 
thoroughly documented and researched – are shown to be related to Catholic high school 
closings in Detroit. Statistical significance of this correlation was not universal, and causation is 
not proven; but the statistical analysis corroborates both of my hypotheses.  
In neighborhoods where Catholic high schools that were open in 1960 closed by 1972, 
the black population share dramatically increased. This population growth is notable compared 
to neighborhoods with open Catholic high schools and even when compared to the general 
demographic trends of the City of Detroit. On the other side, in neighborhoods where Catholic 
high schools remained open from 1960 to 1972, Democratic vote share decreased. This decline 
contrasts both with neighborhoods where the schools had closed by 1972 and the City of Detroit 
as a whole. These results cast my two hypotheses as essentially two sides of the same coin. The 
bridge that links the two – white flight and Catholic Democratic rejection – is the role of 
parochial schools as extensions of parish institutions that wield outsized influence in their 
communities.  
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Figure 39: 1964-1972 Black Population Share Difference by Parish Type  
 
Figure 40: 1960-1972 Black Population Share by Parish Type and the City of Detroit 
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Figure 39 displays the differences in the mean black population share between 
neighborhoods with closed and open Catholic high schools from 1964 to 1972. Whether looking 
at all parishes or eliminating magnet parishes, from 1964 to 1972 the black population share rises 
much more rapidly in neighborhoods with closed schools than those with open schools. This 
increasing divergence is shown by the upward trend of the all parishes and neighborhood 
parishes in Figure 39.  
 Figure 40 tells the same story in a dissimilar way. Figure 40 shows the mean black 
population share in the City of Detroit and only among neighborhoods with open Catholic high 
schools from 1960 to 1972. While the black population share in Detroit increased considerably 
over this time, it actually declined in a correspondingly noticeable manner in neighborhoods with 
open Catholic high schools. Once again, the divergence is clearest when only focusing on 
neighborhood parishes.  
 Both Figures 39 and 40 are limited by the data of the census. The population statistics for 
1960, 1964, and 1968 only differ in the geographic parameters set for them. As schools closed 
from 1960 to 1972, those neighborhoods no longer factor into the analysis for Figure 40, which 
accounts for the data shown. The City of Detroit, however, is stuck with only the two censuses 
for data. 
 Despite these data limitations, support for my first hypotheses is evidenced in these two 
graphs. Figures 39 shows unequivocally that the mean black population share increased in 
neighborhoods where Catholic high schools had closed by 1972. Figure 40 puts this assertion 
into the broader context of white flight and Catholic demographic patterns. Because the black 
population share decreased with open parishes, this suggests that parochial schools had a more 
essential role in white flight. Here, the closing of Catholic high schools appears to have spurred 
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on or at least accelerated suburbanization among Catholics in Detroit. As the schools went, so 
did Catholics.  
 Neither of these graphs, nor my first hypothesis, discounts the factor of white flight in 
causing these school closings. It is nevertheless possible that population loss caused these 
schools to close, which in-turn led Catholics to flee – forming a vicious cycle that contributed to 
white flight. Figure 40 even provides some support of this. In 1960, the black population share in 
these parish neighborhoods – regardless of parish type – was higher than the City of Detroit as a 
whole. This itself is unsurprising given the historical relations between the Catholic and black 
communities in Detroit and America. But due to the census data limitations, the decline in black 
population share among open parishes in 1964 and 1968 suggest that the initial conditions of 
parishes were somewhat important. Parishes with larger black population shares in 1960 seemed 
to close earlier than those with a whiter population.  
This presents and chicken and egg situation, with neither answer fully satisfying the 
question of white flight. Still, entirely explaining white flight is not to purpose of this thesis or 
my first hypothesis. Rather, pointing out the nuance, subtlety, and inherent complexity of the 
situation is the goal that Figures 39 and 40 suggest has been achieved. These Figures provide 
evidence in support of my first hypothesis and develop the context for a tricky two-sided 
relationship between white flight and parochial schools. The initial demographic conditions of 
parishes were important, but the effects of the closing of Catholic high schools on 
suburbanization must not be ignored. 
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Figure 41: 1964-1972 Democratic Vote Share Difference by Parish Type 
Figure 41 provides the counterpart of Figure 39 for my second hypothesis. Figure 41 
shows the difference in Democratic vote share between neighborhoods with Catholic high 
schools that closed between 1964 and 1972 and those that remained open.  The trends for all 
parishes and only neighborhood parishes are unsurprisingly similar. Reflecting the trends of the 
City of Detroit and Catholics nationwide, neighborhoods with Catholic high schools that 
remained open between 1964 and 1972 experienced declining Democratic vote shares, while 
closed parishes saw the opposite occur. These results again make sense given the historical 
context and demographic changes. As parochial schools closed and some neighborhoods became 
predominantly African American, the Democratic vote share increased, while it stagnated and 
then declined in still-white and -Catholic neighborhoods. 
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Figure 42: 1960-1972 Democratic Vote Share by Parish Type and City of Detroit 
Figure 42 aggregates the comparisons between parish and Detroit voting patterns from 
1960 to 1972. This graph is noticeable for the similarities among the data – until 1972. 
Democratic vote shares in Catholic neighborhoods overperformed the City of Detroit in 1960, 
1964, and 1968 before steeply dropping in 1972. The trends of the all parishes, neighborhood 
parishes, and Detroit appear to mirror each other for the first three elections. The Democratic 
vote share of the parishes somewhat reflects the national election trends – with a Democratic 
landslide in 1964 and Republican rout in 1972. The 1972 election, though, is the most important 
to focus on. Despite a 10-point difference in Democratic vote share, Catholics in Detroit still 
appear overwhelmingly Democratic in the midst of a dominant Republican victory nationwide. 
So as with Figure 40 for Figure 39, Figure 42 provides more context surrounding my second 
hypothesis and the illustration in Figure 41. 
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Figure 43: 1960-1972 Democratic Vote Share by Parish Type and State of Michigan 
Figure 43 accomplishes a similar task but uses the State of Michigan as a contrast rather 
than the City of Detroit. Again, the trends seem to mirror one another, only with a gulf between 
the Democratic vote share of parishes and the State of Michigan in each election. Michigan only 
voted for a Republican with Nixon in 1972, but the Democratic vote share was much less than 
the large majority seen in Detroit parishes. 1972 is again the most critical election in this graph. 
The 10-point margin between Detroit and parishes in Figure 42 is translated into Figure 43 but 
between parishes and Michigan. This shows that while Catholics in Detroit ceased voting as 
Democratic, they still overwhelm the Democratic vote share of Michigan, which had voted 
Democratic in the previous three elections. 
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Figure 44: 1960-1972 Democratic Vote Share by Parish Type and US Catholics  
 
Figure 45: 1960-1972 Parish-US Catholic Democratic Vote Share Difference 
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 Figures 44 and 45 bottle the essential elements of my thesis into two graphs. Figure 44 
follows from Figures 42 and 43 in comparing Democratic vote share among all parishes, 
neighborhood parishes, and Catholics nationwide. While Figures 42 and 43 provided context 
surrounding the decline in Democratic vote share among Detroit Catholics, Figure 44 goes one 
step further to compare trends among only Catholics. Democratic voting declines for all three 
groups from 1960 to 1972, but the drop is far more pronounced for Catholics across the country. 
Catholics voted majority Democratic in 1960, 1964, and 1968, but Detroit Catholics stand apart 
in 1972 by still voting nearly 60% Democratic compared to less than 45% for all American 
Catholics. Figure 44 clearly illustrates the relationship between Catholic high schools and 
Catholic voting patterns. Where parishes remained open, Catholics stayed. When Catholics 
stayed, they continued voting more Democratic than did Catholics nationwide. 
 Figure 45 emphasizes that final point by showing the difference in Democratic vote share 
between Detroit parishes and U.S. Catholics. As shown in Figures 44 and 45, the difference in 
1960 was actually negative as Catholics nationwide voted more Democratic that Detroit 
Catholics. But each subsequent election saw Detroit parishes outperforming national Catholics 
by large margins – growing to a peak difference of nearly 25% in 1968 and remaining around 
15% in the Republican landslide of 1972. These Detroit parishes continued voting Democratic in 
the face of opposing national Catholic trends. 
 Figures 39-45 summarize the data presented in the previous four chapters of this thesis. 
They encapsulate the argument my thesis and lend support and essential context for my two 
hypotheses. The evidence explicitly suggests that parishes – with open Catholic high schools as a 
proxy for influence – acted as critical community institutions, connecting religious identity, 
education, and partisanship.  
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 In the broader discussion of Catholic voting patterns and demographic trends, parochial 
schools must no longer be seen simply as one abstract political issue among several more that 
divided Catholic voters and politicians. Parochial schools – and what they mean for the 
institutional power of their corresponding parishes – may be essential to understanding the 
decline in Democratic voting among Catholics along with their desertion of cities.  
 
 
The Archdiocese of (Suburban) Detroit: Contemporary Catholics in 
Metropolitan Detroit and the United States 
 
 
Figure 46: Map of Open Catholic High Schools in Detroit, 2018 
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 Detroit in 2018 looks far different than in 1960 or 1972. Figure 46 conveys this in a map 
of the three Catholic high schools remaining in Detroit.179 Only one school, University of Detroit 
Jesuit High School, has stayed open since 1960. The other two, Detroit Cristo Rey High School 
and Loyola High school, operate in the buildings of the former Catholic high schools of Holy 
Redeemer and St. Francis de Sales, respectively. Cristo Rey opened only a decade ago in 2008, 
while Loyola was started in 1993. In a city that is today 84% African American, 7% Latino, and 
only about 3% non-Hispanic white, these schools primarily serve minority communities.180 
Cristo Rey and Loyola were founded to serve as another option for the people in Detroit living 
around the schools and in the city. This honors the legacies of their predecessors, as Holy 
Redeemer and St. Francis de Sales were part of neighborhood parishes. University of Detroit, 
however, is a magnet parish that fulfills a different role with a focus mainly on its high school 
and seventh- and eighth-grade academy operations rather than a larger church or parish 
community. Nevertheless, the social and economic contexts are vastly different between Detroit 
parishes and high schools today and from 1960 to 1972 that any comparisons must be taken with 
a grain of salt.  
 Another important note is that throughout this thesis I occasionally referred to the 
Democratic vote share in parishes with open Catholic high schools as the voting of “Detroit 
                                                 
179 “Archdiocese of Detroit Detroit Cristo Rey High School ID 5671,” accessed February 26, 2018, 
http://www.aod.org/schools/locations/Detroit-Cristo-Rey-High-School-ID-5671/; “Archdiocese of Detroit Find a 
School,” accessed February 26, 2018, http://www.aod.org/schools/i/find-a-school/; “Archdiocese of Detroit Loyola 
High School ID 590,” accessed February 26, 2018, http://www.aod.org/schools/locations/Loyola-High-School-ID-
590/; “Archdiocese of Detroit School Records,” accessed February 26, 2018, http://www.aod.org/schools/request-
transcripts/; “Archdiocese of Detroit University of Detroit Jesuit High School ID 723,” accessed February 26, 2018, 
http://www.aod.org/schools/locations/University-of-Detroit-Jesuit-High-School-ID-723/; The Official Catholic 
Directory for the Year of Our Lord 2016, The Official Catholic Directory, v. (New York: P.J. Kenedy, 2016), 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/[u]: mdp.39015008491006. 
180 U. S. Census Bureau, “American FactFinder - Community Facts,” accessed March 29, 2018, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml#. 
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Catholics.” Due to the specificity and limited scope of this thesis, I could not fully represent all 
the voting and demographic profiles of all Catholics in the City of Detroit. If my hypotheses are 
correct as the evidence in this thesis suggests, then several thousands of Catholics from 1960 to 
1972 likely remained in neighborhoods with Catholic elementary schools at the very least, and 
they were left out of my study. The data itself does not capture the full white population under 
the “Detroit Catholic” vote. Among all parishes, the total white population in 1972 was 385,994, 
but the white population that was designated as Catholic for living near parishes with open high 
schools was only 192,397. For only neighborhood parishes those figures drop to 267,351 and 
112,826, respectively. These numbers seem drastic at first, with only half of the white population 
categorized as Detroit Catholics, but the concentration is much greater in 1972 due to the far few 
number of open parishes compared to those that had closed. The assumption that all white 
Detroiters were Catholic is also unlikely to hold in reality but was necessary for my study.  
 
Table 19: 2012 and 2016 City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and U.S. Catholic Democratic Vote Share.181 Catholic Vote Share 
comes from average of Gallup Poll, ANES, and Exit Polling Data. 
The voting behavior of Catholics in America has also drastically changed since the time 
of my analysis. Figure 47 displays the Democratic vote share of the City of Detroit, State of 
Michigan, all U.S. Catholics, and only non-Hispanic white Catholics in 2012 and 2016. The City 
                                                 
181 “2012 General Election Results,” City of Detroit, November 6, 2012, http://www.detroitmi.gov/How-Do-
I/Obtain-Voter-Information/Election-Results; “2016 General Election Results,” City of Detroit, November 8, 2016, 
http://www.detroitmi.gov/How-Do-I/Obtain-Voter-Information/Election-Results; “2012 Presidential General 
Election Results - Michigan,” https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?year=2012&fips=26&f=0&off=0& 
elect=0; “Michigan 2016 Presidential And State Election Results,” NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/2016/11/08/ 
501072126/michigan-2016-presidential-and-state-election-results; Michael J. O’Loughlin, “New Data Suggest 
Clinton, Not Trump, Won Catholic Vote,” America Magazine, April 6, 2017, https://www.americamagazine.org/ 
politics-society/2017/04/06/new-data-suggest-clinton-not-trump-won-catholic-vote;  Mary Wisniewski, “Most 
Catholics Vote for Obama, but Latinos and Whites Divided,” Reuters, November 8, 2012, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-campaign-religion/most-catholics-vote-for-obama-but-latinos-and-whites-
divided-idUSBRE8A71M420121108; “Presidential Vote of Catholics” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied 
Research in the Apostolate: Georgetown University). 
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of Detroit and State of Michigan voted rather similarly to the elections in my study, but the 
Catholic vote is where we see an interesting divergence. The t-tests, regressions, and 
comparisons in this thesis attempted to show that white Catholics in Detroit living near open 
Catholic high schools remained more Democratic than their national counterparts. The map in 
Figure 46 and Detroit demographic data clearly illustrate that suburbia is where the vast majority 
of white Catholics now reside. This logically suggests that without that moderating electoral 
force connecting white Catholics to inner cities, the national trend of growing Republican voting 
soon applied to Metro Detroit as well. Yet, white Catholics still vote more Democratic than 
white Protestants, though still much less than black Protestants and Jewish people.182 Whether 
it’s due to the communal nature of Catholicism, historical ties that cannot seem to break 
completely, or simply due to any number of other reasons, white Catholics have not fully shaken 
their Democratic identity.  
This divergence in Latino and white Catholic vote raises new questions regarding the 
intersection of religious, social, and political identity. Whereas in the past, the diversity of white 
ethnic Catholic cultures led to some conflict due to differing customs and political behavior, but 
an overarching Catholic culture and political identity still connected them. From the 1850s when 
the Catholic Church in America was an immigrant church, the Democratic Party won the loyalty 
of Catholics. As that has generally subsided among white Catholics, the tremendous Democratic 
support among Latino Catholics recalls the repetitious nature of history. In recent op-eds, 
Cardinal Timothy Dolan of New York, Cardinal Joseph Tobin of Newark, New Jersey, Sean 
O’Malley of Boston, and Archbishop Vigneron of Detroit have urged support for immigration 
                                                 
182 O’Loughlin, “New Data Suggest Clinton, Not Trump, Won Catholic Vote,” April 6, 2017; Smith and Martinez, 
“How the Faithful Voted,” November 9, 2016; Wisniewski, “Most Catholics Vote for Obama,” November 8, 2012. 
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reform and empathy for immigrants, citing the Church’s roots in immigration and the nativist 
backlash that ensued.183 
This is not to say that the experiences of white ethnic Catholics of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries can be compared to the modern challenges of Latinos in the United States. 
Like white ethnics, “Latinos” is a broad descriptor of a plethora of rich, diverse, peoples with 
various backgrounds and Latin American heritage. Racism affects the Latino Catholic 
community in ways that white ethnic Catholics were mostly able to avoid, despite their own 
encounters with discrimination. And the American Catholic leadership represented the Catholic 
population in its infancy. Parishes and neighborhoods sprung from tightknit groups of ethnic 
white Catholics, giving them some ownership over the direction and culture of the Church. 
Whether immigrants or multiple-generational citizens, Latino Catholics have generally had to 
enter and re-form parish cultures rather than simply start ones in their image. Catholic leadership 
and membership remains older and whiter – and therefore more conservative – than the younger, 
majority-Latino and more liberal future face of the Church.184 
What cues from the past are taken up by Catholic leaders going forward to shape the 
future of the Church are unknown. What cannot be denied, however, are the attempts of 
prominent clergy to steer Catholic political involvement. Though the difference here is the issue-
                                                 
183 Cardinal Sean O’Malley, “Doing What Is Just for Immigrants - The Boston Globe,” BostonGlobe.com, n.d., 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/02/02/doing-what-just-for-immigrants/Z1bENZ9r3q1QA9ORnhwFoI 
/story.html; Cardinal Sean O’Malley, “Mr. President, Don’t Turn Your Back on Dreamers - The Boston Globe,” 
BostonGlobe.com, n.d., https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/09/01/president-don-turn-your-back-
dreamers/hCgwqcJPJF9u0OwaK6yhyK/story.html; Cardinal Timothy Dolan, “Nativism Rears Its Big-Haired 
Head,” NY Daily News, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/timothy-dolan-nativism-rears-big-haired-head-
article-1.2307111; Cardinal Joseph W. Tobin, “Opinion | If You’re a Patriot and a Christian, You Should Support 
the Dream Act,” The New York Times, n.d., sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/opinion/dream-act-
christianity.html; “Detroit’s Archbishop Vigneron Speaks on Immigration and Refugee Resettlement,” Archdiocese 
of Detroit, n.d., http://www.aod.org/our-archdiocese/newsroom/news-releases/2017/march/detroits-archbishop-
vigneron-speaks-on-immigration-and-refugee-resettlement/. 
184 “Religious Landscape Study,” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project (blog), May 11, 2015, 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/; Eng, “Who Are U.S. Catholics?,” September 17, 2015. 
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based rather than partisan-focused. Nevertheless, the particular issues emphasized and the tones 
surrounding them are often revealing. Catholic bishops are theologically and ideologically united 
on the question of immigration and most other issues, but which others are elevated seem up to 
specific clergy. Cardinal Cupich of Chicago will call for gun control reform, while Archbishop 
Vigneron softens his previously tough rhetoric about gay Catholics.185 Cardinal Dolan irks both 
political parties by yearning for the Catholic-Democratic allegiance of his youth while 
simultaneously admonishing the Democratic Party for supposedly straying from their traditional 
principles.186  
To be Catholic is no longer to be a Democrat. The diversity of Catholics prevents such 
simple statements from even having meaning anymore. The Church is evolving as it always has, 
and the role of Catholic leaders and institutions for the future feel both unfamiliar yet more 
important than ever. Comparisons cannot be easily made, and caution should be exercised when 
doing so, but perhaps looking back can provide a way forward. This case study is detached from 
contemporary social, political, and religious contexts and is narrowed to just one city. But the 
implications that accompany the results can be a source of wisdom and inspiration through 
hindsight.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
185 Patricia Montemurri, “Vigneron Softens Tone on Communion for Catholic Gay Supporters,” August 9, 2015; 
Heidi Schlumpf, “Cardinal Cupich Calls for Action on Gun Legislation,” National Catholic Reporter, February 28, 
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Implications on Religion, Identity, and Partisanship 
 
The goal of this thesis, through these t-tests, regressions, and data comparisons, was not 
to refute the decreasing Democratic vote share among Catholics in the United States, State of 
Michigan, City of Detroit, or in neighborhoods surrounding parishes with or without Catholic 
high schools. But putting the decline in a crucible to firmly establish the effects of Catholic 
parishes on these patterns was the mission. Limiting this thesis to the City of Detroit for a case 
study and using high schools to represent parish size, power, and influence allowed for such an 
assessment. 
My two hypotheses allowed me to examine the influence of parishes on the communities 
around them. My first hypothesis argued for a causal function for Catholic parishes in white 
flight. My second hypothesis asserted a similar role in maintaining Democratic Party loyalty 
among Catholics. These hypotheses were tested by looking at the black population share and 
Democratic vote share from 1960 to 1972, but the deeper implications involved suburbanization 
and Catholic Democratic rejection. I found strong support for both hypotheses. This does not 
assume causality, but convincingly suggests that substantial relationships among social 
institutions, suburbanization, partisanship among Catholics exist, with parishes at the center. 
The results of this thesis are still limited in their scope. Demographic variables, 
specifically population and race, were taken into account. But other potentially confounding 
variables could not be controlled for and therefore could have potentially skewed the results. 
Income, education, family size, generation, and occupation among a plethora of other variables 
all have likely effects on both of my hypotheses. 
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Nevertheless, these results and the research design provide a pathway for future research 
on this subject. I see two fruitful routes to follow the lead of this thesis. The first would be to 
repeat the same methodology with other cities during the same time period. While a direct 
relationship will be impossible to demonstrate definitively given the various confounding 
variables, reaffirming my results in cities throughout the country would build a more secure case 
for causality. Cities such as Boston, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, 
Cleveland, and St. Louis could each be studied with the same methodology as this thesis. If 
parochial schools can be similarly used to illustrate the institutional effects of parishes on 
demographic and voting patterns of Catholics nationwide by following the example of this thesis, 
the argument taking the correlations to causality becomes more robust. 
The other path of broadening this analysis would be to use Catholic elementary schools 
as proxies rather than high schools. Catholic elementary schools are far more numerous than 
high schools and eliminate the category of magnet schools. Testing the effects of parishes with 
elementary schools would therefore require reducing the size of neighborhoods through fewer 
precincts and census tracts. Although this would limit the potential influence of parishes 
involved due the lower bar for inclusion in the study. Still, this process would allow for a more 
detailed and wide-ranging study and could more thoroughly examine the results of this thesis. 
Detroit could be studied once again for even more accurate profiles of demographic and electoral 
shifts among neighborhoods, or other cities could be studied with elementary school proxies as 
the base.  
That my results not only allow for future research but actively invite further 
corroboration and potential criticism is exciting. I have argued throughout this thesis that 
parishes are institutions that wield tremendous power in the lives of their parishioners and the 
 97 
  
surrounding communities. With clear pathways for additional analyses of this parish influence, a 
deeper, more nuanced understanding of the interactions of institutions, religion, race, and politics 
seems warranted.  
My thesis built off previous research, bridging gaps in the literature and providing a 
causal mechanism that provides a more overarching grasp of the demographic and political shifts 
that uprooted Catholic social identity in the 1960s and 1970s. I have shown through meticulous 
statistical analysis of t-tests and regressions, along with contextual comparisons, that the 
presence of a Catholic parish operating a high school has statistically significant effects on the 
black population share and the Democratic vote share. Parishes essentially functioned as 
moderating forces against white flight and diverging voting patterns.  
American Catholics constituted a loyal voting bloc of the Democratic Party for over a 
century, and the rather abrupt end of this stark partisanship in the twentieth century represents a 
puzzling phenomenon. Religion and politics have always been intertwined. Social identity flows 
from and is informed by these factors. Parochial schools have historically held a fundamental 
place in the social, spiritual, and political lives of Catholics. Their representation of more than 
just an education – a fight against bigotry, an opportunity for growth, and an invitation for 
community – exemplifies the institutional importance of Catholic parishes.  
What this connection means today is uncertain. The faces, identities, and politics of those 
served by these institutions continue to change. Yet the institutions remain, though not as great in 
number. This thesis presents an opportunity for a slightly revisionist understanding of 
community institutions – specifically Catholic parishes – and their functions in the broader 
context of surrounding communities. How we imagine the roles they can play will determine 
what forces will shape our lives going forward.  
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